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DeRegno.htm
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<!DOCTYPE html>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<title>Thomas Aquinas: De Regno: English</title>
<script type="text/javascript" language="javascript">
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var WPFootnote1 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Aristotle, <i>Hist. Anim.<\/i> I, 1: 488a 7; <i>Eth. Nic.<\/i> I, 5; 1097b 11; <i>ibid.<\/i> IX, 9: 1169b 18; <i>Pol.<\/i> I, 2:\
1253a 3. The Aristotelian formula is always that man is a political animal. Unless special reasons\
suggested to Aquinas the exact textual reproduction of this Aristotelian principle, he generally\
prefers to say that man is a social animal (Seneca, <i>De Beneficiis<\/i>, VII, 1, 7). The combination\
social and political animal is also found in <i>Summa<\/i> I-II, 72, 4; <i>In Periherm<\/i>. I, 2.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote2 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>The source of the teaching in 5-7 is not the Aristotelian Politics but Avicenna, <i>De Anima<\/i> V, 1;\
cf. Appendix 1. See also <i>In Eth.<\/i> prol. 4 (Appendix 2) where St. Thomas, follows more closely\
the Aristotelian doctrine of <i>Pol.<\/i> I, 2: 1252b 30-125 a 1 (see Appendix 3), no longer believes the\
Avicennian reasoning to capable of demonstrating the conclusion that man is a political animal.\
Avicenna’s argument is used by Aquinas in 4 <i>Sent.<\/i>, 26, 1, 1; <i>Quod<\/i> VII, 17; <i>CG<\/i> III, 85 and <i>ibid.<\/i>\
128, 129, 136, 147; Summa I-II, 95, 1.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote3 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>The classification of constitutions in 11-12 is owed to Aristotle, <i>Pol.<\/i> III, 7: 1279a 27 ff. The\
basis of number, however, on which this classification rests, is found inadequate by Aristotle\
himself <i>ibid.<\/i> 1279b 38. In later texts, St. Thomas gradually abandoned it; see <i>In Eth.<\/i> VIII, 10\
(Appendix 4); <i>Summa <\/i>I-II, 95, 4; <i>ibid.<\/i>, 105, 1; II-II, 50, 1, arg. 1; <i>ibid.<\/i>, 61 2; <i>In Pol.<\/i> III, 6\
(Appendix 5). St. Thomas ends up, just as Aristotle did, with a list of constitutions in which each\
finds its essential characteristic in a certain qualification on account of which political power is\
awarded: in monarchy and aristocracy, power is given on account of virtue, in oligarchy on\
account of riches, in democracy on account of liberty.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote4 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Aristotle, <i>Pol.<\/i> I, 2: 1252b 9-30; <i>In Pol.<\/i> I, 1 (Appendix 3). The Aristotelian doctrine is here\
adapted to mediaeval realities in almost the same fashion as in some other earlier writings of\
Aquinas: <i>In Matth.<\/i> XII, 2; <i>In Ioan.<\/i> XIV, 1, 3; <i>In I Cor.<\/i> XI, 4 (p. 333a); <i>In Hebr. <\/i>XI, 3 (p. 414a).\
In the later writings, Aquinas (a) more clearly emphasizes the fact that the Aristotelian city seeks\
the satisfaction of not only the material but also the moral needs of man: <i>In Eth.<\/i> prol. (Appendix\
2); <i>Summa<\/i> I-II, 90, 2; cf. infra 106. Moreover (b) he treats cities and kingdoms not as specifically\
different communities each having its own essential characteristics, but as formally equal and\
only materially, i.e., historically different realizations of the same idea of “perfect community”.\
Proof of this is the use of the combination city or kingdom in <i>Summa<\/i> II-II, 47, 11; ibid. 50, 1;\
<i>ibid.<\/i> 3.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote5 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>In Latin <i>vicus<\/i>. This is neither here nor <i>In Pol.<\/i> I, 1 (Appendix 3) the Aristotelian clan-village but\
the street of the mediaeval town, called <i>vicus<\/i> (v.g. <i>Vicus Straminis<\/i>). In each street, St. Thomas\
says <i>In Pol.<\/i> (Appendix 3), “one craft is exercised, in one the weaver’s, in another the smith’s.”\
Modern towns still preserve the memory of this mediaeval arrangement in street names such as\
Shoemaker Row, Cordwainer Street, Comerslane, Butter Row etc.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote6 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>The word is of Roman imperial origin; cf. St. Isidore, <i>Etymologiae<\/i> XIV, 3, 19. It is also used\
in mediaeval Canon Law; see Gratian’s <i>Decretum<\/i> c. 2 C. VI, p. 3: an ecclesiastical province is\
a territory where there are ten or eleven cities, one king... one metropolitan... In St. Albert’s\
cosmography (<i>De Nat. Locorum<\/i> III, 1 ff: IX, 566 ff) Italy “is a province” but it also “contains\
several provinces”, viz., Calabria, Apulia, Romana, Emilia, Tuscia, Lombardia. Likewise, Spain\
is a province and “has several provinces and kingdoms.” See St. Thomas’ use of the word in <i>2\
Sent.<\/i>, 10, 1, 3 ad 3; <i>4 Sent.<\/i>, 24, 111, 2 sol. 3; <i>Sumna<\/i> II-II, 40, 1. Nothing is very definite about\
this notion except that, at any rate, a province is part of a greater and more comprehensive whole.\
The word is therefore characteristic of a properly mediaeval type of political thinking which still\
retains the memory of the Roman Empire. It was soon to be cast out of the political vocabulary.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote7 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Aristotle <i>Eth. Nic.<\/i> III, 5: 1112b 14 (Latin text). <i>In Eth.<\/i> III, 8: 474; <i>CG<\/i> III, 146; <i>In Matth.<\/i> XII,\
2. In thus tracing back to Aristotle the idea that peace is the chief social good, St. Thomas was\
misled by the fact that the Latin text of the Ethics translated the Greek EUNOMIA (good laws\
well obeyed) by peace.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote8 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Although there is no doubt about the fact that <i>Pol.<\/i> I. c. is the source of this, yet the text cannot\
be shown to depend literally on this source. A disturbing feature of this paraphrase is that the\
author makes it a point of the tyrant’s policy to “forbid marriage”. No trace of such a prohibition\
is to be found in Aristotle’s account or its mediaeval version. St. Thomas is usually very accurate\
even in the most trifling details of his quotations.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote9 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Cf. <i>Summa<\/i> I-II, 105, 1. Carlyle (V, 94) correctly observes that, if these remarks had been\
completed, it would have been under terms similar to those on which in the Summa, i.e., a mixed\
constitution is recommended.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote10 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>A similar problem is discussed in <i>2 Sent.<\/i>, 44, 11, 2 (Appendix 6) and <i>Summa<\/i> II-II, 42, 2 ad 3;\
cf. also <i>Summa<\/i> II-II, 64, 3. For the history of this problem see Carlyle I, 147 ff, 161 ff, 111, 115\
ff. The considerations of the present chapter should also be read against the background of the\
history of the Italian Communes in the XIIIth century; see <i>Cambridge Med. Hist.<\/i> VI, 179 ff.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote11 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Valerius Maximus VI, 2, Ext. 2 (Vincent of Beauvais, <i>Speculum Historiale<\/i> III, 73).<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote12 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Eusmus, <i>Chronicorum<\/i> Lib. II.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote13 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p> Flavius Iosephus, <i>De Bello Iud.<\/i> II, 80 ff, 93, 111. Archelaus, however, was not exiled to\
Lugdunum (Lyons) by Tiberius, but to “Vienna (Vienne), a town in Gaul” by Augustus\
(Josephus, <i>op. cit.<\/i> 111; Eusebius, <i>Chronicorum<\/i> Lib. I. St. Thomas was probably misled by the\
<i>Glossa Ordinaria In Matth.<\/i> ii, 22. The above statement, however is somewhat puzzling in view\
of what Aquinas has said in <i>Catena Aurea, In Matth.<\/i> II, 10, and in the commentary to St.\
Matthew, II, 4.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote14 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Livy XXII, 39, 20. The immediate source of this “sentence” is perhaps one of the many\
“Florilegia” which were so popular in the Middle Ages.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote15 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>This methodical principle should not be considered as St. Thomas’ last word in the matter. The\
method of the <i>Summa<\/i> II-II, 47, 10-12 (on governmental prudence) is distinctly different. See M.-C. CHENU, <i>Bull. Thom.<\/i> VI, 576, n. 2.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote16 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Cf. Aristotle, <i>Phys.<\/i> VIII, 2: 252b 26; St. Gregory, <i>Homil. in Evang.<\/i> II, 29. On the history of this\
notion which is found “in two different streams of thought”, viz. the Neoplatonic and the\
Aristotelian systems, see Muller-Thym 14 ff. “On the rare occasions where St. Thomas uses\
[this] formula (<i>In Phys.<\/i> VIII, 4; <i>Summa<\/i> I, 96, 2 et al.), he wishes it to be taken rather in the sense\
in which the providence exercised by reason over the members of the body and the use of the\
faculties is likened to the providence which God exercises in the world.” If the idea of the\
microcosm is extended to mean that God is in the world as the soul is in the body, then the soul\
would no longer be the form of the body in the Aristotelian and Thomistic sense; rather it would\
be a detached substance in its own right. See <i>Summa<\/i> I-II, 17, 8 in 2 and ad 2; <i>ibid.<\/i> 110, 1 ad 2.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote17 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Aristotle, <i>Pol.<\/i> I, 2: 1252b 30; <i>ibid.<\/i> III, 9: 1280b 33. The source of what follows is again\
Aristotle, Pol. III, 9: 1280a 25-1281a 10. Especially derived from the Stagirite are (a) the\
definition of “good life” which is “virtuous life” (1280b 5-10), (b) the remark about slaves and\
animals (1280a 32), (c) the remark that the exchange of material goods does not make a society,\
i.e., a state (1280a 25, b 23: Aristotle’s criticism of Plato.)<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote18 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p><i>Populus Christianus<\/i>, i.e., the institutional unity of all Christians, whose head is the Pope\
“holding the apex of both powers, spiritual and temporal”: <i>2 Sent.<\/i>, 44, exp. text. (Appendix 8).\
All-important in Aquinas’ political thought, this notion was for the first time criticized by the\
Dominican John of Paris, A.D. 1302; see <i>CG<\/i> 4, 76 (Appendix 7) and John of Paris’ corrections\
of this text (<i>loc. cit.<\/i>).<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote19 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Ps.-Cyril of Alexandria: [<i>Romano Pontifici<\/i>] <i>primates mundi tamquam ipsi Domino Iesu Christo\
obediunt<\/i>. The text is quoted in <i>C. Impugn.<\/i> 3 (IV, 29); <i>4 Sent.<\/i>, 24, III, 2 sol. 2; Cf. <i>Errores\
Graecorum<\/i> 2. The <i>Liber Thesaurorum<\/i> from which this authority was drawn is a compilation of\
texts of the Greek Fathers, made by Aquinas’ contemporary and confrère Bonacursius (<i>Script.\
O.P.<\/i> I, 156, 159). In regard to the doctrine cf. <i>2 Sent.<\/i>, 44, exp. text. (Appendix 8); <i>4 Sent.<\/i> 37,\
exp. text.; <i>CG<\/i> IV, 76 (Appendix 7); <i>Summa<\/i> II-II, 60, 6 ad 3. Best interpretation of this passage:\
Gilson, <i>Dante<\/i> 183 ff, 206 ff; <i>Id., La philosophie au MA<\/i> 570 ff.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote20 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>Aristotle, <i>Physics<\/i> VII, 3: 246b 4. <i>In Phys.<\/i> VII, 5, 3; <i>Summa<\/i> I-II, 49, 2 ad 1. “Long before\
Aristotle, probably before Hippocrates, it was held that, corresponding to the four elements, fire,\
air, water, earth, and the four qualities, hot, cold, moist, dry, are the four humors of the body,\
viz., blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. These three sets of elements, qualities and\
humors could then be brought, by permutation and combination, into a complex system of\
arrangements, based upon the following scheme: hot + moist = blood; hot + dry = yellow bile;\
cold + moist = phlegm; cold + dry = black bile, the different combinations giving the qualitative\
aspects of disease, and, by the same token, of the physiologic action of drugs. The whole\
arrangement made up the ‘humoral pathology’ which regarded health and disease as the proper\
adjustment or imbalance respectively of the different components mentioned, and the scheme\
was further elaborated by Galen and the Arabian physicians, in that remedies and their\
compounds were classified in numerical scales according to the ‘degree’ or relative proportions\
of their several qualities.” Garrison 77.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote21 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>St. Albert relates the same fact in <i>De Natura Locorum<\/i> II, 3: IX, 563.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote22 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p><i>Pol.<\/i> VI, 4: 1318b 9-15. William of Moerbeka translated this passage thus: <i>optimus enim\
polmius, qui terrae cultivus est... ubi vivit multitudo ab agricultura vel pascuis... Non vacans,\
ut non saepe congregationes faciat. Propterea... aliena non concupiscunt, sed delectabilius est\
ipsis laborare quam politizare et principari<\/i> (Susemihl 466 f.) St. Thomas misunderstood the\
words <i>congregationes facere<\/i> which he took to mean “the crowding and dwelling of the people\
within the walls of the town,” while Aristotle speaks of civic assemblies.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote23 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>St. Thomas refers to <i>Pol.<\/i> V, 13: 1297a 17 ff, 20. Manifestly the translation of the word <i>timae<\/i>\
by <i>pretium<\/i> made it impossible for him to understand this Aristotelian teaching. The word\
timocracy is derived from <i>timema<\/i>, i.e., valuation of property (in Latin <i>census<\/i>). Timocracy thus\
is the rule of those who are equals, in virtue of coming up to a certain moderate property\
qualification. Aquinas is quite aware of the insufficiency of his commentary on timocracy, for\
in none of his other writings does he make use of this notion.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
var WPFootnote24 = '<span class="WPNormal"><p>See however <i>Summa<\/i> II-II, 42, 2 arg. 3 and ad 3; <i>ibid.<\/i> 64, 3.<\/p>\
<\/span>'
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<h2>De regno<br>
ad regem Cypri</h2>
<h3>ON KINGSHIP<br>
TO THE KING OF CYPRUS<br>
<br>
by<br>
Thomas Aquinas<br>
<br>
translated by<br>
Gerald B. Phelan,<br>
revised by<br>
I. Th. Eschmann, O.P.<br>
<br>
Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949<br>
Re-edited and chapter numbers aligned with Latin, by Joseph Kenny, O.P.<br></h3>
<hr>
<h3>CONTENTS</h3>
</center>
<dl>
<dd>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#0">Address to the King of Cyprus</a>
<p style="text-align: center"><b>BOOK ONE: THE THEORY OF MONARCHY</b>
<ol>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#1">Preliminary observations</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#2">Different kinds of rule</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#3">The absolute merits of monarchy</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#4">The absolute demerits of tyranny</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#5">The historical merits of monarchy. Discussion</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#6">The historical merits of monarchy. Solution</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#7">Limited monarchy (fragment); Christian allegiance and tyrannical domination</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#8">The reward of a king: (a) honour and glory?</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#9">The reward of a king: (b) eternal beatitude</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#10">The reward of a king: (c) eternal beatitude (continued)</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#11">The reward of a king: (d) temporal prosperity</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#12">The punishment for tyranny</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#13">The method of this investigation</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#14">God, the Creator, and the King-Founder</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#15">Divine and human government (fragment); The king in Christendom</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#16">The king in Christendom (continued)</a>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: center"><b>BOOK TWO: THE PRACTICE OF A MONARCH</b>
<ol>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#21">The King-Founder. Geopolitical considerations</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#22">Geopolitical considerations (continued)</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#23">Economic autarchy</a>
<li>
<a href="DeRegno.htm#24">Geopolitical considerations (continued)</a><br>
<p><a href="DeRegno.htm#25">Appendix: Selected parallel texts</a>
</ol>
<hr>
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<td><b>Prooemium</b>
<td>
<a name="0" id="0"><b>Introduction</b></a>
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<td>Cogitanti mihi quid offerrem regiae celsitudini dignum meaeque professioni congruum et officio, id occurrit potissime offerendum, ut regi librum de regno conscriberem, in quo et regni originem et ea quae ad regis officium pertinent, secundum Scripturae divinae auctoritatem, philosophorum dogma et exempla laudatorum principum diligenter depromerem, iuxta ingenii proprii facultatem, principium, progressum, consummationem operis ex illius expectans auxilio qui est rex regum et dominus dominantium: per quem reges regnant, Deus, magnus dominus, et rex magnus super omnes deos.
<td>[1] As I was turning over in my mind what I might present to Your Majesty as a gift at once worthy of Your Royal Highness and befitting my profession and office, it seemed to me a highly appropriate offering that, for a king, I should write a book on kingship, in which, so far as my ability permits, I should carefully expound, according to the authority of Holy Writ and the teachings of the philosophers as well as the practice of worthy princes, both the origin of kingly government and the things which pertain to the office of a king, relying for the beginning, progress and accomplishment of this work, on the help of Him, Who is King of Kings, Lord of Lords, through Whom kings rule, God the Mighty Lord, King great above all gods.
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<td><b>Liber 1</b>
<td>
<a name="1" id="1"><b>BOOK ONE</b></a>
<tr style="text-align:center">
<td><b>Caput 1<br>
Quod necesse est homines simul viventes ab aliquo diligenter regi</b>
<td><b>CHAPTER 1<br>
[That people living together must be ruled responsibly by someone]</b>
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<td>Principium autem intentionis nostrae hinc sumere oportet, ut quid nomine regis intelligendum sit, exponatur. In omnibus autem quae ad finem aliquem ordinantur, in quibus contingit sic et aliter procedere, opus est aliquo dirigente, per quod directe debitum perveniatur ad finem. Non enim navis, quam secundum diversorum ventorum impulsum in diversa moveri contingit, ad destinatum finem perveniret nisi per gubernatoris industriam dirigeretur ad portum. Hominis autem est aliquis finis, ad quem tota vita eius et actio ordinatur, cum sit agens per intellectum, cuius est manifeste propter finem operari. Contingit autem diversimode homines ad finem intentum procedere, quod ipsa diversitas humanorum studiorum et actionum declarat. Indiget igitur homo aliquo dirigente ad finem.
<td>[3] In all things which are ordered towards an end, wherein this or that course may be adopted, some directive principle is needed through which the due end may be reached by the most direct route. A ship, for example, which moves in different directions. according to the impulse of the changing winds, would never reach its destination were it not brought to port by the skill of the pilot. Now, man has an end to which his whole life and all his actions are ordered; for man is an intelligent agent, and it is clearly the part of an intelligent agent to act in view of an end. Men also adopt different methods in proceeding towards their proposed end, as the diversity of men’s pursuits and actions clearly indicates. Consequently man needs some directive principle to guide him towards his end.
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<td>Est autem unicuique hominum naturaliter insitum rationis lumen, quo in suis actibus dirigatur ad finem. Et si quidem homini conveniret singulariter vivere, sicut multis animalium, nullo alio dirigente indigeret ad finem, sed ipse sibi unusquisque esset rex sub Deo summo rege, in quantum per lumen rationis divinitus datum sibi, in suis actibus se ipsum dirigeret. Naturale autem est homini ut sit animal sociale et politicum, in multitudine vivens, magis etiam quam omnia alia animalia, quod quidem naturalis necessitas declarat.
<td>
[4] To be sure, the light of reason is placed by nature in every man, to guide him in his acts towards his end. Wherefore, if man were intended to live alone, as many animals do, he would require no other guide to his end. Each man would be a king unto himself, under God, the highest King, inasmuch as he would direct himself in his acts by the light of reason given him from on high. Yet it is natural for man, more than for any other animal, to be a social and political animal, <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote1',%20WPFootnote1%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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</script> to live in a group.
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<td>
[5] This is clearly a necessity of man’s nature. <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote2',%20WPFootnote2%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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<td>Aliis enim animalibus natura praeparavit cibum, tegumenta pilorum, defensionem, ut dentes, cornua, ungues, vel saltem velocitatem ad fugam. Homo autem institutus est nullo horum sibi a natura praeparato, sed loco omnium data est ei ratio, per quam sibi haec omnia officio manuum posset praeparare, ad quae omnia praeparanda unus homo non sufficit. Nam unus homo per se sufficienter vitam transigere non posset. Est igitur homini naturale quod in societate multorum vivat.
<td>For all other animals, nature has prepared food, hair as a covering, teeth, horns, claws as means of defence or at least speed in flight, while man alone was made without any natural provisions for these things. Instead of all these, man was endowed with reason, by the use of which he could procure all these things for himself by the work of his hands. Now, one man alone is not able to procure them all for himself, for one man could not sufficiently provide for life, unassisted. It is therefore natural that man should live in the society of many.
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<td>Amplius: aliis animalibus insita est naturalis industria ad omnia ea quae sunt eis utilia vel nociva, sicut ovis naturaliter aestimat lupum inimicum. Quaedam etiam animalia ex naturali industria cognoscunt aliquas herbas medicinales et alia eorum vitae necessaria. Homo autem horum, quae sunt suae vitae necessaria, naturalem cognitionem habet solum in communi, quasi eo per rationem valente ex universalibus principiis ad cognitionem singulorum, quae necessaria sunt humanae vitae, pervenire. Non est autem possibile quod unus homo ad omnia huiusmodi per suam rationem pertingat. Est igitur necessarium homini quod in multitudine vivat, ut unus ab alio adiuvetur et diversi diversis inveniendis per rationem occupentur, puta, unus in medicina, alius in hoc, alius in alio.
<td>[6] Moreover, all other animals are able to, discern, by inborn skill, what is useful and what is injurious, even as the sheep naturally regards the wolf as his enemy. Some animals also recognize by natural skill certain medicinal herbs and other things necessary for their life. Man, on the contrary, has a natural knowledge of the things which are essential for his. life only in a general fashion, inasmuch as he is able to attain knowledge of the particular things necessary for human life by reasoning from natural principles. But it is not possible for one man to arrive at a knowledge of all these things by his own individual reason. It is therefore necessary for man to live in a multitude so that each one may assist his fellows, and different men may be occupied in seeking, by their reason, to make different discoveries—one, for example, in medicine, one in this and another in that.
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<td>Hoc etiam evidentissime declaratur per hoc, quod est proprium hominis locutione uti, per quam unus homo aliis suum conceptum totaliter potest exprimere. Alia quidem animalia exprimunt mutuo passiones suas in communi, ut canis in latratu iram, et alia animalia passiones suas diversis modis. Magis igitur homo est communicativus alteri quam quodcumque aliud animal, quod gregale videtur, ut grus, formica et apis. Hoc ergo considerans Salomon in Eccle. IV, 9, ait: melius est esse duos quam unum. Habent enim emolumentum mutuae societatis.
<td>[7] This point is further and most plainly evidenced by the fact that the. use of speech is a prerogative proper to man. By this means, one man is able fully to express his conceptions to others. Other animals, it is true, express their feelings to one another in a general way, as a dog may express anger by barking and other animals give vent to other feelings in various fashions. But man communicates with his kind more completely than any other animal known to be gregarious, such as the crane, the ant or the bee.—With this in mind, Solomon says: “It is better that there be two than one; for they have the advantage of their company.”’
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<td>Si ergo naturale est homini quod in societate multorum vivat, necesse est in hominibus esse per quod multitudo regatur. Multis enim existentibus hominibus et unoquoque id, quod est sibi congruum, providente, multitudo in diversa dispergeretur, nisi etiam esset aliquis de eo quod ad bonum multitudinis pertinet curam habens; sicut et corpus hominis et cuiuslibet animalis deflueret, nisi esset aliqua vis regitiva communis in corpore, quae ad bonum commune omnium membrorum intenderet. Quod considerans Salomon dicit: ubi non est gubernator, dissipabitur populus.
<td>[8] If, then, it is natural for man to live in the society of many, it is necessary that there exist among men some means by which the group may be governed. For where there are many men together and each one is looking after his own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an agency to take care of what appertains to the commonweal. In like manner, the body of a man or any other animal would disintegrate unless there were a general ruling force within the body which watches over the common good of all members. With this in mind, Solomon says [Eccl. 4:9]: “Where there is no governor, the people shall fall.”
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<td>Hoc autem rationabiliter accidit: non enim idem est quod proprium et quod commune. Secundum propria quidem differunt, secundum autem commune uniuntur. Diversorum autem diversae sunt causae. Oportet igitur, praeter id quod movet ad proprium bonum uniuscuiusque, esse aliquid quod movet ad bonum commune multorum. Propter quod et in omnibus quae in unum ordinantur, aliquid invenitur alterius regitivum. In universitate enim corporum per primum corpus, scilicet caeleste, alia corpora ordine quodam divinae providentiae reguntur, omniaque corpora per creaturam rationalem. In uno etiam homine anima regit corpus, atque inter animae partes irascibilis et concupiscibilis ratione reguntur. Itemque inter membra corporis unum est principale, quod omnia movet, ut cor, aut caput. Oportet igitur esse in omni multitudine aliquod regitivum.
<td>[9] Indeed it is reasonable that this should happen, for what is proper and what is common are not identical. Things differ by what is proper to each: they are united by what they have in common. But diversity of effects is due to diversity of causes. Consequently, there must exist something which impels towards the common good of the many, over and above that which impels towards the particular good of each individual. Wherefore also in all things that are ordained towards one end, one thing is found to rule the rest. Thus in the corporeal universe, by the first body, i.e. the celestial body, the other bodies are regulated according to the order of Divine Providence; and all bodies are ruled by a rational creature. So, too in the individual man, the soul rules the body; and among the parts of the soul, the irascible and the concupiscible parts are ruled by reason. Likewise, among the members of a body, one, such as the heart or the head, is the principal and moves all the others. Therefore in every multitude there must be some governing power.
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<td><b>Caput 2<br>
Distinguitur multiplex dominium sive regimen</b>
<td>
<a name="2" id="2"><b>CHAPTER 2 DIFFERENT KINDS OF RULE</b></a>
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<td>Contingit autem in quibusdam, quae ordinantur ad finem, et recte, et non recte procedere. Quare et in regimine multitudinis et rectum, et non rectum invenitur. Recte autem dirigitur unumquodque quando ad finem convenientem deducitur; non recte autem quando ad finem non convenientem. Alius autem est finis conveniens multitudini liberorum, et servorum. Nam liber est, qui sui causa est; servus autem est, qui id quod est, alterius est. Si igitur liberorum multitudo a regente ad bonum commune multitudinis ordinetur, erit regimen rectum et iustum, quale convenit liberis. Si vero non ad bonum commune multitudinis, sed ad bonum privatum regentis regimen ordinetur, erit regimen iniustum atque perversum, unde et dominus talibus rectoribus comminatur per Ezech. XXXIV, 2, dicens: vae pastoribus qui pascebant semetipsos (quasi sua propria commoda quaerentes): nonne greges a pastoribus pascuntur? Bonum siquidem gregis pastores quaerere debent, et rectores quilibet bonum multitudinis sibi subiectae.
<td>[10] Now it happens in certain things which are, ordained towards an end that one may proceed in a right way and also in a wrong way. So, too, in the government of a multitude there is a distinction between right and wrong. A thing is rightly directed when it is led towards a befitting end; wrongly when it is led towards an unbefitting end. Now the end which befits a multitude of free men is different from that which befits a multitude of slaves, for the free man is one who exists for his own sake, while the slave, as such, exists for the sake of another. If, therefore, a multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler towards the common good of the multitude, that rulership will be right and just, as is suitable to free men. If, on the other hand, a rulership aims, not at the common good of the multitude, but at the private good of the ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted rulership. The Lord, therefore, threatens such rulers, saying by the mouth of Ezekiel: “Woe to the shepherds that feed themselves (seeking, that is, their own interest): should not the flocks be fed by the shepherd?” Shepherds indeed should seek the good of their flocks, and every ruler, the good of the multitude subject to him.
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<td>Si igitur regimen iniustum per unum tantum fiat qui sua commoda ex regimine quaerat, non autem bonum multitudinis sibi subiectae, talis rector tyrannus vocatur, nomine a fortitudine derivato, quia scilicet per potentiam opprimit, non per iustitiam regit: unde et apud antiquos potentes quique tyranni vocabantur. Si vero iniustum regimen non per unum fiat, sed per plures, siquidem per paucos, oligarchia vocatur, id est principatus paucorum, quando scilicet pauci propter divitias opprimunt plebem, sola pluralitate a tyranno differentes. Si vero iniquum regimen exerceatur per multos, democratia nuncupatur, id est potentatus populi, quando scilicet populus plebeiorum per potentiam multitudinis opprimit divites. Sic enim populus totus erit quasi unus tyrannus.
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[11] If an unjust government is carried on by one man alone, <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote3',%20WPFootnote3%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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</script> who seeks his own benefit from his rule and not the good of the multitude subject to him, such a ruler is called a tyrant—a word derived from <i>strength</i> —because he oppresses by might instead of ruling by justice. Thus among the ancients all powerful men were called tyrants. If an. unjust government is carried on, not by one but by several, and if they be few, it is called an oligarchy, that is, the rule of a few. This occurs when a few, who differ from the tyrant only by the fact that they are more than one, oppress the people by means of their wealth. If, finally, the bad government is carried on by the multitude, it is called a democracy, i.e. control by the populace, which comes about when the plebeian people by force of numbers oppress the rich. In this way the whole people will be as one tyrant.
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<td>Similiter autem et iustum regimen distingui oportet. Si enim administretur per aliquam multitudinem, communi nomine politia vocatur, utpote cum multitudo bellatorum in civitate vel provincia dominatur. Si vero administretur per paucos, virtuosos autem, huiusmodi regimen aristocratia vocatur, id est potentatus optimus, vel optimorum, qui propterea optimates dicuntur. Si vero iustum regimen ad unum tantum pertineat, ille proprie rex vocatur: unde dominus per Ezech. dicit: servus meus David rex super omnes erit, et pastor unus erit omnium eorum.
<td>[12] In like manner we must divide just governments. If the government is administered by many, it is given the name common to all forms of government, viz. polity, as for instance when a group of warriors exercise dominion over a city or province. If it is administered by a few men of virtue, this kind of government is called an aristocracy, i.e. noble governance, or governance by noble men, who for this reason are called the Optimates. And if a just government is in the hands of one man alone, he is properly called a king. Wherefore the Lord says by the mouth of Ezekiel:” “My servant, David, shall be king over them and all of them shall have one shepherd.”
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<td>Ex quo manifeste ostenditur quod de ratione regis est quod sit unus, qui praesit, et quod sit pastor commune multitudinis bonum, et non suum commodum quaerens.
<td>[13] From this it is clearly shown that the idea of king implies that he be one man who is chief and that he be a shepherd, seeking the common good of the multitude and not his own.
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<td>Cum autem homini competat in multitudine vivere, quia sibi non sufficit ad necessaria vitae si solitarius maneat, oportet quod tanto sit perfectior multitudinis societas, quanto magis per se sufficiens erit ad necessaria vitae. Habetur siquidem aliqua vitae sufficientia in una familia domus unius, quantum scilicet ad naturales actus nutritionis, et prolis generandae, et aliorum huiusmodi; in uno autem vico, quantum ad ea quae ad unum artificium pertinent; in civitate vero, quae est perfecta communitas, quantum ad omnia necessaria vitae; sed adhuc magis in provincia una propter necessitatem compugnationis et mutui auxilii contra hostes. Unde qui perfectam communitatem regit, id est civitatem vel provinciam, antonomastice rex vocatur; qui autem domum regit, non rex, sed paterfamilias dicitur. Habet tamen aliquam similitudinem regis, propter quam aliquando reges populorum patres vocantur.
<td>
[14] Now since man must live in a group, because he is not sufficient unto himself to procure the necessities of life were he to remain solitary, it follows that a society will be the more perfect the more it is sufficient unto itself to procure the necessities of life. <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote4',%20WPFootnote4%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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</script> There is, to some extent, sufficiency for life in one <i>family of one household</i>, namely, insofar as pertains to the natural acts of nourishment and the begetting of offspring and other things of this kind. Self-sufficiency exists, furthermore, in one <i>street</i> <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote5',%20WPFootnote5%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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</script> with regard to those things which belong to the trade of one guild. In a <i>city</i>, which is the perfect community, it exists with regard to all the necessities of life. Still more self-sufficiency is found in a <i>province</i> <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote6',%20WPFootnote6%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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</script> because of the need of fighting together and of mutual help against enemies. Hence the man ruling a perfect community, i.e. a city or a province, is antonomastically called the king. The ruler of a household is called father, not king, although he bears a certain resemblance to the king, for which reason kings are sometimes called the fathers of their peoples.
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<td>Ex dictis igitur patet, quod rex est qui unius multitudinem civitatis vel provinciae, et propter bonum commune, regit; unde Salomon in Eccle. V, 8, dicit: universae terrae rex imperat servienti.
<td>[15] It is plain, therefore, from what has been said, that a king is one who rules the people of one city or province, and rules them for the common good. Wherefore Solomon says [Eccl. 5:8]: “The king rules over all the land subject to him.”
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<td><b>Caput 3<br>
Quod utilius est multitudinem hominum simul viventium regi per unum quam per plures</b>
<td>
<a name="3" id="3"><b>CHAPTER 3<br>
WHETHER IT IS MORE EXPEDIENT FOR A CITY OR PROVINCE TO BE RULED BY ONE MAN OR BY MANY</b></a>
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<td>His autem praemissis requirere oportet quid provinciae vel civitati magis expedit: utrum a pluribus regi, vel uno. Hoc autem considerari potest ex ipso fine regiminis.
<td>[16] Having set forth these preliminary points we must now inquire what is better for a province or a city: whether to be ruled by one man or by many.
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<td>Ad hoc enim cuiuslibet regentis ferri debet intentio, ut eius quod regendum suscepit salutem procuret. Gubernatoris enim est, navem contra maris pericula servando, illaesam perducere ad portum salutis. Bonum autem et salus consociatae multitudinis est ut eius unitas conservetur, quae dicitur pax, qua remota, socialis vitae perit utilitas, quinimmo multitudo dissentiens sibi ipsi sit onerosa. Hoc igitur est ad quod maxime rector multitudinis intendere debet, ut pacis unitatem procuret. Nec recte consiliatur, an pacem faciat in multitudine sibi subiecta, sicut medicus, an sanet infirmum sibi commissum. Nullus enim consiliari debet de fine quem intendere debet, sed de his quae sunt ad finem. Propterea apostolus commendata fidelis populi unitate: solliciti, inquit, sitis servare unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis. Quanto igitur regimen efficacius fuerit ad unitatem pacis servandam, tanto erit utilius. Hoc enim utilius dicimus, quod magis perducit ad finem. Manifestum est autem quod unitatem magis efficere potest quod est per se unum, quam plures. Sicut efficacissima causa est calefactionis quod est per se calidum. Utilius igitur est regimen unius, quam plurium.
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[17] This question may be considered first from the viewpoint of the purpose of government. The aim of any ruler should be directed towards securing the welfare of that which he undertakes to rule. The duty of the pilot, for instance, is to preserve his ship amidst the perils of the sea. and to bring it unharmed to the port of safety. Now the welfare and safety of a multitude formed into a society lies in the preservation of its unity, which is called peace. If this is removed, the benefit of social life is lost and, moreover, the multitude in its disagreement becomes a burden to itself. The chief concern of the ruler of a multitude, therefore, is to procure the unity of peace. It is not even legitimate for him to deliberate whether he shall establish peace in the multitude subject to him, just as a physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal the sick man encharged to him, <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote7',%20WPFootnote7%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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</script> for no one should deliberate about an end which he is obliged to seek, but only about the means to attain that end. Wherefore the Apostle, having commended the unity of the faithful people, says: “Be ye careful to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace.” Thus, the more efficacious a. government is in keeping the unity of peace, the more useful it will be. For we call that more useful which leads more directly to the end. Now it is manifest that what is itself one can more efficaciously bring about unity than several—just as the most efficacious cause of heat is that which is by its nature hot. Therefore the rule of one man is more useful than the rule of many.
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<td>Amplius, manifestum est quod plures multitudinem nullo modo conservant, si omnino dissentirent. Requiritur enim in pluribus quaedam unio ad hoc, quod quoquo modo regere possint: quia nec multi navem in unam partem traherent, nisi aliquo modo coniuncti. Uniri autem dicuntur plura per appropinquationem ad unum. Melius igitur regit unus quam plures ex eo quod appropinquant ad unum.
<td>[18] Furthermore, it is evident that several persons could by no means preserve the stability of the community if they totally disagreed. For union is necessary among them if they are to rule at all: several men, for instance, could not pull a ship in one direction unless joined together in some fashion. Now several are said to be united according as they come closer to being one. So one man rules better than several who come near being one.
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<td>Adhuc: ea, quae sunt ad naturam, optime se habent: in singulis enim operatur natura, quod optimum est. Omne autem naturale regimen ab uno est. In membrorum enim multitudine unum est quod omnia movet, scilicet cor; et in partibus animae una vis principaliter praesidet, scilicet ratio. Est etiam apibus unus rex, et in toto universo unus Deus factor omnium et rector. Et hoc rationabiliter. Omnis enim multitudo derivatur ab uno. Quare si ea quae sunt secundum artem, imitantur ea quae sunt secundum naturam, et tanto magis opus artis est melius, quanto magis assequitur similitudinem eius quod est in natura, necesse est quod in humana multitudine optimum sit quod per unum regatur.
<td>[19] Again, whatever is in accord with nature is best, for in all things nature does what is best. Now, every natural governance is governance by one. In the multitude of bodily members there is one which is the principal mover, namely, the heart; and among the powers of the soul one power presides as chief, namely, the reason. Among bees there is one king bee’ and in the whole universe there is One God, Maker and Ruler of all things. And there is a reason for this. Every multitude is derived from unity. Wherefore, if artificial things are an imitation of natural things’ and a work of art is better according as it attains a closer likeness to what is in nature, it follows that it is best for a human multitude to be ruled by one person.
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<td>Hoc etiam experimentis apparet. Nam provinciae vel civitates quae non reguntur ab uno, dissensionibus laborant et absque pace fluctuant, ut videatur adimpleri quod dominus per prophetam conqueritur, dicens: pastores multi demoliti sunt vineam meam. E contrario vero provinciae et civitates quae sub uno rege reguntur, pace gaudent, iustitia florent, et affluentia rerum laetantur. Unde dominus pro magno munere per prophetas populo suo promittit, quod poneret sibi caput unum, et quod princeps unus erit in medio eorum.
<td>[20] This is also evident from experience. For provinces or cities which are not ruled by one person are torn with dissensions and tossed about without peace, so that the complaint seems to be fulfilled which the Lord uttered through the Prophet [Jer 12:10]: “Many pastors have destroyed my vineyard.” On the other hand, provinces and cities which are ruled under one king enjoy peace, flourish in justice, and delight in prosperity. Hence, the Lord by His prophets promises to His people as a great reward that He will give them one head and that “one Prince will be in the midst of them” [Ez 34:24, Jer 30:21].
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<td><b>Caput 4<br>
Quod, sicut dominium unius optimum est, quando est iustum, ita oppositum eius est pessimum, probatur multis rationibus et argumentis</b>
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<a name="4" id="4"><b>CHAPTER 4<br>
THAT THE DOMINION OF A TYRANT IS THE WORST</b></a>
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<td>Sicut autem regimen regis est optimum, ita regimen tyranni est pessimum.
<td>[21] Just as the government of a king is the best, so the government of a tyrant is the worst.
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<td>Opponitur enim politiae quidem democratia, utrumque enim, sicut ex dictis apparet, est regimen quod per plures exercetur; aristocratiae vero oligarchia, utrumque enim exercetur per paucos; regnum autem tyrannidi, utrumque enim per unum exercetur. Quod autem regnum sit optimum regimen, ostensum est prius. Si igitur optimo opponitur pessimum, necesse est quod tyrannis sit pessimum.
<td>[22] For democracy stands in contrary opposition to polity, since both are governments carried on by many persons, as is clear from what has already been said; while oligarchy is the opposite of aristocracy, since both are governments carried on by a few persons; and kingship is the opposite of tyranny since both are carried on by one person. Now, as has been shown above, monarchy is the best government. If, therefore, “it is the contrary of the best that is worst.” it follows that tyranny is the worst kind of government.
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<td>Adhuc: virtus unita magis est efficax ad effectum inducendum, quam dispersa vel divisa. Multi enim congregati simul trahunt quod divisim per partes singulariter a singulis trahi non posset. Sicut igitur utilius est virtutem operantem ad bonum esse magis unam, ut sit virtuosior ad operandum bonum, ita magis est nocivum si virtus operans malum sit una, quam divisa. Virtus autem iniuste praesidentis operatur ad malum multitudinis, dum commune bonum multitudinis in sui ipsius bonum tantum retorquet. Sicut igitur in regimine iusto, quanto regens est magis unum, tanto est utilius regimen, ut regnum melius est quam aristocratia, aristocratia vero quam politia; ita e converso erit et in iniusto regimine, ut videlicet quanto regens est magis unum, tanto magis sit nocivum. Magis igitur est nociva tyrannis quam oligarchia: oligarchia autem quam democratia.
<td>[23] Further, a united force is more efficacious in producing its effect than a force which is scattered or divided. Many persons together can pull a load which could not be pulled by each one taking his part separately and acting individually. Therefore, just as it is more useful for a force operating for a good to be more united, in order that it may work good more effectively, so a force operating for evil is more harmful when it is one than when it is divided. Now, the power of one who rules unjustly works to the detriment of the multitude, in that he diverts the common good of the multitude to his own benefit. Therefore, for the same reason that, in a just government, the government is better in proportion as the ruling power is one-thus monarchy is better than aristocracy, and aristocracy better than polity—so the contrary will be true of an unjust government, namely, that the ruling power will be more harmful in proportion as it is more unitary. Consequently, tyranny is more harmful than oligarchy; and oligarchy more harmful than democracy.
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<td>Amplius: per hoc regimen fit iniustum, quod spreto bono communi multitudinis, quaeritur bonum privatum regentis. Quanto igitur magis receditur a bono communi, tanto est regimen magis iniustum. Plus autem receditur a bono communi in oligarchia, in qua quaeritur bonum paucorum, quam in democratia, in qua quaeritur bonum multorum; et adhuc plus receditur a bono communi in tyrannide, in qua quaeritur bonum tantum unius: omni enim universitati propinquius est multum quam paucum, et paucum quam unum solum. Regimen igitur tyranni est iniustissimum.
<td>[24] Moreover, a government becomes unjust by the fact that the ruler, paying no heed to the common good, seeks his own private good. Wherefore the further he departs from the common good the more unjust will his government be. But there is a greater departure from the common good in an oligarchy, in which the advantage of a few is sought, than in a democracy, in which the advantage of many is sought; and there is a still greater departure from the common good in a tyranny, where the advantage of only one man is sought. For a large number is closer to the totality than a small number, and a small number than only one. Thus, the government of a tyrant is the most unjust.
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<td>Similiter autem manifestum fit considerantibus divinae providentiae ordinem, quae optime universa disponit. Nam bonum provenit in rebus ex una causa perfecta, quasi omnibus adunatis quae ad bonum iuvare possunt, malum autem singillatim ex singularibus defectibus. Non enim est pulchritudo in corpore, nisi omnia membra fuerint decenter disposita; turpitudo autem contingit, quodcumque membrum indecenter se habeat. Et sic turpitudo ex pluribus causis diversimode provenit, pulchritudo autem uno modo ex una causa perfecta: et sic est in omnibus bonis et malis, tanquam hoc Deo providente, ut bonum ex una causa sit fortius, malum autem ex pluribus causis sit debilius. Expedit igitur ut regimen iustum sit unius tantum, ad hoc ut sit fortius. Quod si in iniustitiam declinat regimen, expedit magis ut sit multorum, ut sit debilius, et se invicem impediant. Inter iniusta igitur regimina tolerabilius est democratia, pessimum vero tyrannis.
<td>[25] The same conclusion is made clear to those who consider the order of Divine Providence, which disposes everything in the best way. In all things, good ensues from one perfect cause, i.e. from the totality of the conditions favourable to the production of the effect, while evil results from any one partial defect. There is beauty in a body when all its members are fittingly disposed; ugliness, on the other hand, arises when any one member is not fittingly disposed. Thus ugliness results in different ways from many causes; beauty in one way from one perfect cause. It is thus with all good and evil things, as if God so provided that good, arising from one cause, be stronger, and evil, arising from many causes, be weaker. It is expedient therefore that a just government be that of one man only in order that it may be stronger; however, if the government should turn away from justice, it is more expedient that it be a government by many, so that it may be weaker and the many may mutually hinder one another. Among unjust governments, therefore, democracy is the most tolerable, but the worst is tyranny.
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<td>Idem etiam maxime apparet, si quis consideret mala quae ex tyrannis proveniunt, quia cum tyrannus, contempto communi bono, quaerit privatum, consequens est ut subditos diversimode gravet, secundum quod diversis passionibus subiacet ad bona aliqua affectanda. Qui enim passione cupiditatis detinetur, bona subditorum rapit: unde Salomon: rex iustus erigit terram, vir avarus destruet eam. Si vero iracundiae passioni subiaceat, pro nihilo sanguinem fundit, unde per Ezech. XXII, 27, dicitur: principes eius in medio eius quasi lupi rapientes praedam ad effundendum sanguinem. Hoc igitur regimen fugiendum esse, sapiens monet, dicens: longe esto ab homine potestatem habente occidendi, quia scilicet non pro iustitia, sed per potestatem occidit pro libidine voluntatis. Sic igitur nulla erit securitas, sed omnia sunt incerta cum a iure disceditur, nec firmari quidquam potest quod positum est in alterius voluntate, ne dicam libidine. Nec solum in corporalibus subditos gravat, sed etiam spiritualia eorum bona impedit, quia qui plus praeesse appetunt quam prodesse, omnem profectum subditorum impediunt, suspicantes omnem subditorum excellentiam suae iniquae dominationi praeiudicium esse. Tyrannis enim magis boni quam mali suspecti sunt, semperque his aliena virtus formidolosa est.
<td>[26] This same conclusion is also apparent if one considers the evils which come from tyrants. Since a tyrant, despising the common good, seeks his private interest, it follows that he will oppress his subjects in different ways according as he is dominated by different passions to acquire certain goods. The one who is enthralled by the passion of cupidity seizes the goods of his subjects; whence Solomon says [Prov 29:4]: “A just king sets up the land; a covetous man shall destroy it.” If he is dominated by the passion of anger, he sheds blood for nothing; whence it is said by Ezekiel: ‘ “Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood.” Therefore this kind of government is to be avoided as the Wise man admonishes [Sirach 9:13]: “Keep far from the man who has the power to kill,” because he kills not for justice’ sake but by his power, for the lust of his will. Thus there can be no safety. Everything is uncertain when there is a departure from justice. Nobody will be able firmly to state: This thing is such and such, when it depends upon the will of another, not to say upon his caprice. Nor does the tyrant merely oppress his subjects in corporal things but he also hinders their spiritual good. Those who seek more to use, than to be of use to, their subjects prevent all progress, suspecting all excellence in their subjects to be prejudicial to their own evil domination. For tyrants hold the good in greater suspicion than the wicked, and to them the valour of others is always fraught with danger.
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<td>Conantur igitur praedicti tyranni, ne ipsorum subditi virtuosi effecti magnanimitatis concipiant spiritum et eorum iniquam dominationem non ferant, ne inter subditos amicitiae foedus firmetur et pacis emolumento ad invicem gaudeant, ut sic dum unus de altero non confidit, contra eorum dominium aliquid moliri non possint. Propter quod inter ipsos discordias seminant, exortas nutriunt, et ea quae ad foederationem hominum pertinent, ut connubia et convivia, prohibent, et caetera huiusmodi, per quae inter homines solet familiaritas et fiducia generari. Conantur etiam ne potentes aut divites fiant, quia de subditis secundum suae malitiae conscientiam suspicantes, sicut ipsi potentia et divitiis ad nocendum utuntur, ita timent ne potentia subditorum et divitiae eis nocivae reddantur. Unde et Iob XV, 21, de tyranno dicitur: sonitus terroris semper in auribus eius, et cum pax sit (nullo scilicet malum ei intentante), ille semper insidias suspicatur.
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[27] So the above-mentioned tyrants strive to prevent those of their subjects who have become virtuous from acquiring valour and high spirit in order that they may not want to cast off their iniquitous domination. They also see to it that there be no friendly relations among these so that they may not enjoy the benefits resulting from being on good terms with one another, for as long as one has no confidence in the other, no plot will be set up against the tyrant’s domination. Wherefore they sow discords among the people, foster any that have arisen, and forbid anything which furthers society and co-operation among men, such as marriage, company at table and anything of like character, through which familiarity and confidence are engendered among men. They moreover strive to prevent their subjects from becoming powerful and rich since, suspecting these to be as wicked as themselves, they fear their power and wealth; for the subjects might become harmful to them even as they are accustomed to use power and wealth to harm others. <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote8',%20WPFootnote8%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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</script> Whence in the Book of Job it is said of the tyrant [15:21]: “The sound of dread is always in his ears and when there is peace (that is, when there is no one to harm him), he always suspects treason.”
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<td>Ex hoc autem contingit ut, dum praesidentes, qui subditos ad virtutes inducere deberent, virtuti subditorum nequiter invident et eam pro posse impediunt, sub tyrannis pauci virtuosi inveniantur. Nam iuxta sententiam philosophi apud illos inveniuntur fortes viri, apud quos fortissimi quique honorantur, et ut Tullius dicit: iacent semper et parum vigent, quae apud quosque improbantur. Naturale etiam est ut homines, sub timore nutriti, in servilem degenerent animum et pusillanimes fiant ad omne virile opus et strenuum: quod experimento patet in provinciis quae diu sub tyrannis fuerunt. Unde apostolus, Col. III, 21, dicit: patres, nolite ad indignationem provocare filios vestros, ne pusillo animo fiant.
<td>[28] It thus results that when rulers, who ought to induce their subjects to virtue,” are wickedly jealous of the virtue of their subjects and hinder it as much as they can, few virtuous men are found under the rule of tyrants. For, according to Aristotle’s sentence [ <i>Eth.</i> III, 11: 1116a 20], brave men are found where brave men are honoured. And as Tullius says [ <i>Tuscul. Disp.</i> I, 2, 4]: “Those who are despised by everybody are disheartened and flourish but little.” It is also natural that men, brought up in fear, should become mean of spirit and discouraged in the face of any strenuous and manly task. This is shown by experience in provinces that have long been under tyrants. Hence the Apostle says to the Colossians: “Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged.”
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<td>Haec igitur nocumenta tyrannidis rex Salomon considerans, dicit: regnantibus impiis, ruinae hominum, quia scilicet per nequitiam tyrannorum subiecti a virtutum perfectione deficiunt; et iterum dicit: cum impii sumpserint principatum, gemet populus, quasi sub servitute deductus; et iterum: cum surrexerint impii, abscondentur homines, ut tyrannorum crudelitatem evadant. Nec est mirum, quia homo absque ratione secundum animae suae libidinem praesidens nihil differt a bestia, unde Salomon: leo rugiens et ursus esuriens princeps impius super populum pauperem; et ideo a tyrannis se abscondunt homines sicut a crudelibus bestiis, idemque videtur tyranno subiici, et bestiae saevienti substerni.
<td>[29] So, considering these evil effects of tyranny King Solomon says [Prov 28:12]: “When the wicked reign, men are ruined” because, forsooth, through the wickedness of tyrants, subjects fall away from the perfection of virtue. And again he says [Prov 29:2]: “When the wicked rule the people shall mourn, as though led into slavery.” And again [Prov 28:28]: “When the wicked rise up men shall hide themselves”, that they may escape the cruelty of the tyrant. It is no wonder, for a man governing without reason, according to the lust of his soul, in no way differs from the beast. Whence Solomon says [Prov 28:15]: ”As a roaring lion and a hungry bear, so is a wicked prince over the poor people.” Therefore men hide from tyrants as from cruel beasts and it seems that to be subject to a tyrant is the same thing as to lie prostrate beneath a raging beast.
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<td><b>Caput 5<br>
Quomodo variatum est dominium apud Romanos, et quod interdum apud eos magis aucta est respublica ex dominio plurium</b>
<td>
<a name="5" id="5"><b>CHAPTER 5<br>
WHY THE ROYAL DIGNITY IS RENDERED HATEFUL TO THE SUBJECTS</b></a>
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<td>Quia igitur optimum et pessimum consistunt in monarchia, id est principatu unius, multis quidem propter tyrannorum malitiam redditur regia dignitas odiosa. Quidam vero dum regimen regis desiderant, incidunt in saevitiam tyrannorum, rectoresque quamplures tyrannidem exercent sub praetextu regiae dignitatis.
<td>[30] Because both the best and the worst government are latent in monarchy, i.e. in the rule of one man, the royal dignity is rendered hateful to many people on account of the wickedness of tyrants. Some men, indeed, whilst they desire to be ruled by a king, fall under the cruelty of tyrants, and not a few rulers exercise tyranny under the cloak of royal dignity.
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<td>Horum quidem exemplum evidenter apparet in Romana republica. Regibus enim a populo Romano expulsis, dum regium vel potius tyrannicum fastum ferre non possent, instituerant sibi consules et alios magistratus per quos regi coeperunt et dirigi, regnum in aristocratiam commutare volentes et, sicut refert Salustius: incredibile est memoratu, quantum, adepta libertate, in brevi Romana civitas creverit. Plerumque namque contingit, ut homines sub rege viventes, segnius ad bonum commune nitantur, utpote aestimantes id quod ad commune bonum impendunt non sibi ipsis conferre sed alteri, sub cuius potestate vident esse bona communia. Cum vero bonum commune non vident esse in potestate unius, non attendunt ad bonum commune quasi ad id quod est alterius, sed quilibet attendit ad illud quasi suum:
<td>[31] A clear example of this is found in the Roman Republic. When the kings had been driven out by the Roman people, because they could not bear the royal, or rather tyrannical, arrogance, they instituted consuls and other magistrates by whom they began to be ruled and guided. They changed the kingdom into an aristocracy, and, as Sallust relates [ <i>Bellum Catilinae</i> VI, 7]: “The Roman city, once liberty was won, waxed incredibly strong and great in a remarkably short time.” For it frequently happens that men living under a king strive more sluggishly for the common good, inasmuch as they consider that what they devote to the common good, they do not confer upon themselves but upon another, under whose power they see the common goods to be. But when they see that the common good is not under the power of one man, they do not attend to it as if it belonged to another, but each one attends to it as if it were his own.
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<td>unde experimento videtur quod una civitas per annuos rectores administrata, plus potest interdum quam rex aliquis, si haberet tres vel quatuor civitates; parvaque servitia exacta a regibus gravius ferunt quam magna onera, si a communitate civium imponantur. Quod in promotione Romanae reipublicae servatum fuit. Nam plebe ad militiam scribebatur, et pro militantibus stipendia exsolvebant, et cum stipendiis exsolvendis non sufficeret commune aerarium, in usus publicos opes venere privatae, adeo ut praeter singulos annulos aureos, singulasque bullas, quae erant dignitatis insignia, nihil sibi auri ipse etiam senatus reliquerit.
<td>[32] Experience thus teaches that one city administered by rulers, changing annually, is sometimes able to do more than some kings having, perchance, two or three cities; and small services exacted by kings weigh more heavily than great burdens imposed by the community of citizens. This held good in the history of the Roman Republic. The plebs were enrolled in the army and were paid wages for military service. Then when the common treasury was failing, private riches came forth for public uses, to such an extent that not even the senators retained any gold for themselves save one ring and the one bulla (the insignia of their dignity).
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<td>Sed cum dissensionibus fatigarentur continuis, quae usque ad bella civilia excreverunt, quibus bellis civilibus eis libertas, ad quam multum studuerant, de manibus erepta est, sub potestate imperatorum esse coeperunt, qui se reges a principio appellari noluerunt, quia Romanis fuerat nomen regium odiosum. Horum autem quidam more regio bonum commune fideliter procuraverunt, per quorum studium Romana respublica et aucta et conservata est. Plurimi vero eorum in subditos quidem tyranni, ad hostes vero effecti desides et imbecilles, Romanam rempublicam ad nihilum redegerunt.
<td>[33] On the other hand, when the Romans were worn out by continual dissensions taking on the proportion of civil wars, and when by these wars the freedom for which they had greatly striven was snatched from their hands, they began to find themselves under the power of emperors who, from the beginning, were unwilling to be called kings, for the royal name was hateful to the Romans. Some emperors, it is true, faithfully cared for the common good in a kingly manner, and by their zeal the commonwealth was increased and preserved. But most of them became tyrants towards their subjects while indolent and vacillating before their enemies, and brought the Roman commonwealth to naught.
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<td>Similis etiam processus fuit in populo Hebraeorum. Primo quidem dum sub iudicibus regebantur, undique diripiebantur ab hostibus. Nam unusquisque quod bonum erat in oculis suis, hoc faciebat. Regibus vero eis divinitus datis ad eorum instantiam, propter regum malitiam, a cultu unius Dei recesserunt et finaliter ducti sunt in captivitatem.
<td>[34] A similar process took place, also, among the Hebrew people. At first, while they were ruled by judges, they were ravished by their enemies on every hand, for each one “did what was good in his sight” (1 Sam 3:18). Yet when, at their own pressing, God gave them kings, they departed from the worship of the one God and were finally led into bondage, on account of the wickedness of their kings.
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<td>Utrinque igitur pericula imminent: sive dum timetur tyrannus, evitetur regis optimum dominium, sive dum hoc consideratur, potestas regia in malitiam tyrannicam convertatur.
<td>[351 Danger thus lurks on either side. Either men are held by the fear of a tyrant and they miss the opportunity of having that very best government which is kingship; or, they want a king and the kingly power turns into tyrannical wickedness.
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<td><b>Caput 6<br>
Quod in regimine plurium magis saepe contingit dominium tyrannicum, quam ex regimine unius; et ideo regimen unius melius est</b>
<td>
<a name="6" id="6"><b>CHAPTER 6<br>
THAT IT IS A LESSER EVIL WHEN A MONARCHY TURNS INTO TYRANNY THAN WHEN AN ARISTOCRACY BECOMES CORRUPT</b></a>
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<td>Cum autem inter duo, ex quorum utroque periculum imminet, eligere oportet, illud potissime eligendum est ex quo sequitur minus malum. Ex monarchia autem, si in tyrannidem convertatur, minus malum sequitur quam ex regimine plurium optimatum, quando corrumpitur.
<td>[36] When a choice is to be made between two things, from both of which danger impends, surely that one should be chosen from which the lesser evil follows. Now, lesser evil follows from the corruption of a monarchy (which is tyranny) than from the corruption of an aristocracy.
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<td>Dissensio enim, quae plurimum sequitur ex regimine plurium, contrariatur bono pacis, quod est praecipuum in multitudine sociali: quod quidem bonum per tyrannidem non tollitur, sed aliqua particularium hominum bona impediuntur, nisi fuerit excessus tyrannidis quod in totam communitatem desaeviat. Magis igitur praeoptandum est unius regimen quam multorum, quamvis ex utroque sequantur pericula.
<td>[37] Group government [polyarchy] most frequently breeds dissension. This dissension runs counter to the good of peace which is the principal social good. A tyrant, on the other hand, does not destroy this good, rather he obstructs one or the other individual interest of his subjects—unless, of course, there be an excess of tyranny and the tyrant rages against the whole community. Monarchy is therefore to be preferred to polyarchy, although either form of government might become dangerous.
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<td>Adhuc: illud magis fugiendum videtur, ex quo pluries sequi possunt magna pericula. Frequentius autem sequuntur maxima pericula multitudinis ex multorum regimine, quam ex regimine unius. Plerumque enim contingit ut ex pluribus aliquis ab intentione communis boni deficiat, quam quod unus tantum. Quicumque autem, ex pluribus praesidentibus, divertat ab intentione communis boni, dissensionis periculum in subditorum multitudine imminet, quia dissentientibus principibus consequens est ut in multitudine sequatur dissensio. Si vero unus praesit, plerumque quidem ad bonum commune respicit; aut si a bono communi intentionem avertat, non statim sequitur ut ad subditorum depressionem intendat, quod est excessus tyrannidis et in malitia regiminis maximum gradum tenens, ut supra ostensum est. Magis igitur sunt fugienda pericula quae proveniunt ex gubernatione multorum, quam ex gubernatione unius.
<td>[38] Further, that from which great dangers may follow more frequently is, it would seem, the more to be avoided. Now, considerable dangers to the multitude follow more frequently from polyarchy than from monarchy. There is a greater chance that, where there are many rulers, one of them will abandon the intention of the common good than that it will be abandoned when there is but one ruler. When any one among several rulers turns aside from the pursuit of the common good, danger of internal strife threatens the group because, when the chiefs quarrel, dissension will follow in the people. When, on the other hand, one man is in command, he more often keeps to governing for the sake of the common good. Should he not do so, it does not immediately follow that he also proceeds to the total oppression of his subjects. This, of course, would be the excess of tyranny and the worst wickedness in government, as has been shown above. The dangers, then, arising from a polyarchy are more to be guarded against than those arising from a monarchy.
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<td>Amplius, non minus contingit in tyrannidem verti regimen multorum quam unius, sed forte frequentius. Exorta namque dissensione per regimen plurium, contingit saepe unum super alios superare et sibi soli multitudinis dominium usurpare, quod quidem ex his quae pro tempore fuerunt, manifeste inspici potest. Nam fere omnium multorum regimen est in tyrannidem terminatum, ut in Romana republica manifeste apparet; quae cum diu per plures magistratus administrata fuisset, exortis simultatibus, dissensionibus et bellis civilibus, in crudelissimos tyrannos incidit. Et universaliter si quis praeterita facta et quae nunc fiunt diligenter consideret, plures inveniet exercuisse tyrannidem in terris quae per multos reguntur, quam in illis quae gubernantur per unum.
<td>[39] Moreover, in point of fact, a polyarchy deviates into tyranny not less but perhaps more frequently than a monarchy. When, on account of there being many rulers, dissensions arise in such a government, it often happens that the power of one preponderates and he then usurps the government of the multitude for himself. This indeed may be clearly seen from history. There has hardly ever been a polyarchy that did not end in tyranny. The best illustration of this fact is the history of the Roman Republic. It was for a long time administered by the magistrates but then animosities, dissensions and civil wars arose and it fell into the power of the most cruel tyrants. In general, if one carefully considers what has happened in the past and what is happening in the present, he will discover that more men have held tyrannical sway in lands previously ruled by many rulers than in those ruled by one.
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<td>Si igitur regium, quod est optimum regimen, maxime vitandum videatur propter tyrannidem; tyrannis autem non minus, sed magis, contingere solet in regimine plurium, quam unius, relinquitur simpliciter magis esse expediens sub rege uno vivere, quam sub regimine plurium.
<td>[40] The strongest objection why monarchy, although it is “the best form of government”, is not agreeable to the people is that, in fact, it may deviate into tyranny. Yet tyranny is wont to occur not less but more frequently on the basis of a polyarchy than on the basis of a monarchy. It follows that it is, in any case, more expedient to live under one king than under the rule of several men.
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<td><b>Caput 7<br>
Conclusio, quod regimen unius simpliciter sit optimum. Ostendit qualiter multitudo se debet habere circa ipsum, quia auferenda est ei occasio ne tyrannizet, et quod etiam in hoc est tolerandus propter maius malum vitandum</b>
<td>
<a name="7" id="7"><b>CHAPTER 7<br>
HOW PROVISION MIGHT BE MADE THAT THE KING MAY NOT FALL INTO TYRANNY</b></a>
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<td>Quia ergo unius regimen praeeligendum est, quod est optimum, et contingit ipsum in tyrannidem converti quod est pessimum, ut ex dictis patet, laborandum est diligenti studio ut sic multitudini provideatur de rege, ut non incidant in tyrannum.
<td>[41] Therefore, since the rule of one man, which is the best, is to be preferred, and since it may happen that it be changed into a tyranny, which is the worst (all this is clear from what has been said), a scheme should be carefully worked out which would prevent the multitude ruled by a king from falling into the hands of a tyrant.
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<td>Primum autem est necessarium ut talis conditionis homo ab illis, ad quos hoc spectat officium, promoveatur in regem, quod non sit probabile in tyrannidem declinare. Unde Samuel, Dei providentiam erga institutionem regis commendans, ait I Reg.: quaesivit sibi dominus virum secundum cor suum et praecepit ei dominus ut esset dux super populum suum. Deinde sic disponenda est regni gubernatio, ut regi iam instituto tyrannidis subtrahatur occasio. Simul etiam sic eius temperetur potestas, ut in tyrannidem de facili declinare non possit. Quae quidem ut fiant, in sequentibus considerandum erit. Demum vero curandum est, si rex in tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter posset occurri.
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[42] First, it is necessary that the man who is raised up to be king by those whom it concerns should be of such condition that it is improbable that he should become a tyrant. Wherefore Daniel, commending the providence of God with respect to the institution of the king says [1 Sam 13:14]: “The Lord sought a man according to his own heart, and the Lord appointed him to be prince over his people.” Then, once the king is established, the government of the kingdom must be so arranged that opportunity to tyrannize is removed. At the same time his power should be so tempered that he cannot easily fall into tyranny. <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote9',%20WPFootnote9%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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[43] Finally, provision must be made for facing the situation should the king stray into tyranny. <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote10',%20WPFootnote10%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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<td>Et quidem si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyrannidem tolerare ad tempus, quam contra tyrannum agendo multis implicari periculis, quae sunt graviora ipsa tyrannide. Potest enim contingere ut qui contra tyrannum agunt praevalere non possint, et sic provocatus tyrannus magis desaeviat. Quod si praevalere quis possit adversus tyrannum, ex hoc ipso proveniunt multoties gravissimae dissensiones in populo; sive dum in tyrannum insurgitur, sive post deiectionem tyranni dum erga ordinationem regiminis multitudo separatur in partes. Contingit etiam ut interdum, dum alicuius auxilio multitudo expellit tyrannum, ille, potestate accepta, tyrannidem arripiat, et timens pati ab alio quod ipse in alium fecit, graviori servitute subditos opprimat. Sic enim in tyrannide solet contingere, ut posterior gravior fiat quam praecedens, dum praecedentia gravamina non deserit et ipse ex sui cordis malitia nova excogitat. Unde Syracusis quondam Dionysii mortem omnibus desiderantibus, anus quaedam, ut incolumis et sibi superstes esset, continue orabat; quod ut tyrannus cognovit, cur hoc faceret interrogavit. Tum illa: puella, inquit, existens, cum gravem tyrannum haberemus, mortem eius cupiebam, quo interfecto, aliquantum durior successit; eius quoque dominationem finiri magnum existimabam: tertium te importuniorem habere coepimus rectorem. Itaque si tu fueris absumptus, deterior in locum tuum succedet.
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[44] Indeed, if there be not an excess of tyranny it is more expedient to tolerate the milder tyranny for a while than, by acting against the tyrant, to become involved in many perils more grievous than the tyranny itself. For it may happen that those who act against the tyrant are unable to prevail and the tyrant then will rage the more. But should one be able to prevail against the tyrant, from this fact itself very grave dissensions among the people frequently ensue: the multitude may be broken up into factions either during their revolt against the tyrant, or in process of the organization of the government, after the tyrant has been overthrown. Moreover, it sometimes happens that while the multitude is driving out the tyrant by the help of some man, the latter, having received the power, thereupon seizes the tyranny. Then, fearing to suffer from another what he did to his predecessor, he oppresses his subjects with an even more grievous slavery. This is wont to happen in tyranny, namely, that the second becomes more grievous than the one preceding, inasmuch as, without abandoning the previous oppressions, he himself thinks up fresh ones from the malice of his heart. Whence in Syracuse, at a time when everyone desired the death of Dionysius, a certain old woman kept constantly praying that he might be unharmed and that he might survive her. When the tyrant learned this he asked why she did it. Then she said: “When I was a girl we had a harsh tyrant and I wished for his death; when he was killed, there succeeded him one who was a little harsher. I was very eager to see the end of his dominion also, and we began to have a third ruler still more harsh—that was you. So if you should be taken away, a worse would succeed in your place.” <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote11',%20WPFootnote11%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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<td>Et si sit intolerabilis excessus tyrannidis, quibusdam visum fuit ut ad fortium virorum virtutem pertineat tyrannum interimere, seque pro liberatione multitudinis exponere periculis mortis: cuius rei exemplum etiam in veteri testamento habetur. Nam Aioth quidam Eglon regem Moab, qui gravi servitute populum Dei premebat, sica infixa in eius femore interemit, et factus est populi iudex.
<td>[45] If the excess of tyranny is unbearable, some have been of the opinion that it would be an act of virtue for strong men to slay the tyrant and to expose themselves to the danger of death in order to set the multitude free. An example of this occurs even in the Old Testament, for a certain Aioth slew Eglon, King of Moab, who was oppressing the people of God under harsh slavery, thrusting a dagger into his thigh; and he was made a judge of the people [Judges 3:14 ff].
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<td>Sed hoc apostolicae doctrinae non congruit. Docet enim nos Petrus non bonis tantum et modestis, verum etiam dyscolis dominis reverenter subditos esse. Haec est enim gratia si propter conscientiam Dei sustineat quis tristitias patiens iniuste; unde cum multi Romani imperatores fidem Christi persequerentur tyrannice, magnaque multitudo tam nobilium quam populi esset ad fidem conversa, non resistendo sed mortem patienter et animati sustinentes pro Christo laudantur, ut in sacra Thebaeorum legione manifeste apparet; magisque Aioth iudicandus est hostem interemisse, quam populi rectorem, licet tyrannum: unde et in veteri testamento leguntur occisi fuisse hi qui occiderunt Ioas, regem Iuda, quamvis a cultu Dei recedentem, eorumque filii reservati secundum legis praeceptum.
<td>[46] But this opinion is not in accord with apostolic teaching. For Peter admonishes us to be reverently subject to our masters, not only to the good and gentle but also the froward [1 Pet 2:18-19]: “For if one who suffers unjustly bear his trouble for conscience’ sake, this is grace.” Wherefore, when many emperors of the Romans tyrannically persecuted the faith of Christ, a great number both of the nobility and the common people were converted to the faith and were praised for patiently bearing death for Christ. They did not resist although they were armed, and this is plainly manifested in the case of the holy Theban legion.” Aioth, then, must be considered rather as having slain a foe than assassinated a ruler, however tyrannical, of the people. Hence in the Old Testament we also read that they who killed Joas, the king of Juda, who had fallen away from the worship of God, were slain and their children spared according to the precept of the law” (2 Sam 14:5-6).
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<td>Esset autem hoc multitudini periculosum et eius rectoribus, si privata praesumptione aliqui attentarent praesidentium necem, etiam tyrannorum. Plerumque enim huiusmodi periculis magis exponunt se mali quam boni. Malis autem solet esse grave dominium non minus regum quam tyrannorum, quia secundum sententiam Salomonis, Prov.: dissipat impios rex sapiens. Magis igitur ex huiusmodi praesumptione immineret periculum multitudini de amissione regis, quam remedium de subtractione tyranni.
<td>[47] Should private persons attempt on their own private presumption to kill the rulers, even though tyrants, this would be dangerous for the multitude as well as for their rulers. This is because the wicked usually expose themselves to dangers of this kind more than the good, for the rule of a king, no less than that of a tyrant, is burdensome to them since, according to the words of Solomon [Prov 20:26]: “A wise king scatters the wicked.” Consequently, by presumption of this kind, danger to the people from the loss of a good king would be more probable than relief through the removal of a tyrant.
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<td>Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum saevitiam non privata praesumptione aliquorum, sed auctoritate publica procedendum.
<td>[48] Furthermore, it seems that to proceed against the cruelty of tyrants is an action to be undertaken, not through the private presumption of a few, but rather by public authority.
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<td>Primo quidem, si ad ius multitudinis alicuius pertineat sibi providere de rege, non iniuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destitui vel refrenari eius potestas, si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nec putanda est talis multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiam si eidem in perpetuo se ante subiecerat: quia hoc ipse meruit, in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens ut exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum a subditis non reservetur. Sic Romani Tarquinium superbum, quem in regem susceperant, propter eius et filiorum tyrannidem a regno eiecerunt, substituta minori, scilicet consulari, potestate. Sic etiam Domitianus, qui modestissimis imperatoribus Vespasiano patri et Tito fratri eius successerat, dum tyrannidem exercet, a senatu Romano interemptus est, omnibus quae perverse Romanis fecerat per senatusconsultum iuste et salubriter in irritum revocatis. Quo factum est ut beatus Ioannes Evangelista, dilectus Dei discipulus, qui per ipsum Domitianum in Patmos insulam fuerat exilio relegatus, ad Ephesum per senatusconsultum remitteretur.
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[49] If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power. It must not be thought that such a multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did not act faithfully as the office of a king demands. Thus did the Romans, who had accepted Tarquin the Proud as their king, cast him out from the kingship on account of his tyranny and the tyranny of his sons; and they set up in their place a lesser power, namely, the consular power. Similarly Domitian, who had succeeded those most moderate emperors, Vespasian, his father, and Titus, his brother, was slain by the Roman senate when he exercised tyranny, and all his wicked deeds were justly, and profitably declared null and void by a decree of the senate. Thus it came about that Blessed John the Evangelist, the beloved disciple of God, who had been exiled to the island of Patmos by that very Domitian, was sent back to Ephesus by a decree of the senate. <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote12',%20WPFootnote12%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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<td>Si vero ad ius alicuius superioris pertineat multitudini providere de rege, expectandum est ab eo remedium contra tyranni nequitiam. Sic Archelai, qui in Iudaea pro Herode patre suo regnare iam coeperat, paternam malitiam imitantis, Iudaeis contra eum querimoniam ad Caesarem Augustum deferentibus, primo quidem potestas diminuitur ablato sibi regio nomine et medietate regni sui inter duos fratres suos divisa; deinde, cum nec sic a tyrannide compesceretur, a Tiberio Caesare relegatus est in exilium apud Lugdunum, Galliae civitatem.
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[50] If, on the other hand, it pertains to the right of a higher authority to provide a king for a certain multitude, a remedy against the wickedness of a tyrant is to be looked for from him. Thus when Archelaus, who had already begun to reign in Judaea in the place of Herod his father, was imitating his father’s wickedness, a complaint against him having been laid before Caesar Augustus by the Jews, his power was at first diminished by depriving him of his title of king and by dividing one-half of his kingdom between his two brothers. Later, since he was not restrained from tyranny even by this means, Tiberius Caesar sent him into exile to Lugdunum, a city in Gaul. <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote13',%20WPFootnote13%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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<td>Quod si omnino contra tyrannum auxilium humanum haberi non potest, recurrendum est ad regem omnium Deum, qui est adiutor in opportunitatibus in tribulatione. Eius enim potentiae subest ut cor tyranni crudele convertat in mansuetudinem, secundum Salomonis sententiam, Prov.: cor regis in manu Dei, quocumque voluerit, inclinabit illud. Ipse enim regis Assueri crudelitatem, qui Iudaeis mortem parabat, in mansuetudinem vertit. Ipse est qui ita Nabuchodonosor crudelem regem convertit, quod factus est divinae potentiae praedicator. Nunc igitur, inquit, ego Nabuchodonosor laudo, et magnifico, et glorifico regem caeli, quia opera eius vera et viae eius iudicia, et gradientes in superbia potest humiliare. Tyrannos vero, quos reputat conversione indignos, potest auferre de medio vel ad infimum statum reducere, secundum illud sapientis: sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus, et sedere fecit mites pro eis. Ipse est qui videns afflictionem populi sui in Aegypto et audiens eorum clamorem, Pharaonem tyrannum deiecit cum exercitu suo in mare. Ipse est qui memoratum Nabuchodonosor prius superbientem, non solum eiectum de regni solio sed etiam de hominum consortio, in similitudinem bestiae commutavit. Nec etiam abbreviata manus eius est, ut populum suum a tyrannis liberare non possit. Promittit enim populo suo per Isaiam requiem se daturum a labore et confusione, ac servitute dura, qua antea servierat. Et per Ezech. dicit: liberabo meum gregem de ore eorum, scilicet pastorum qui pascunt se ipsos.
<td>[51] Should no human aid whatsoever against a tyrant be forthcoming, recourse must be had to God, the King of all, Who is a helper in due time in tribulation. For it lies in his power to turn the cruel heart of the tyrant to mildness. According to Solomon [Prov 21:1]: “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, withersoever He will He shall turn it.” He it was who turned into mildness the cruelty of King Assuerus, who was preparing death for the Jews. He it was who so filled the cruel king Nabuchodonosor with piety that he became a proclaimer of the divine power. “Therefore,” he said, “I, Nabuchodonosor do now praise and magnify and glorify the King of Heaven; because all His works are true and His ways judgments, and they that walk in pride He is able to abase” (Dan 4:34). Those tyrants, however, whom he deems unworthy of conversion, he is able to put out of the way or to degrade, according to the words of the Wise Man [Sirach 10:17]: “God has overturned the thrones of proud princes and has set up the meek in their stead.” He it was who, seeing the affliction of his people in Egypt and hearing their cry, hurled Pharaoh, a tyrant over God’s people, with all his army into the sea. He it was who not only banished from his kingly throne the above-mentioned Nabuchodonosor because of his former pride, but also cast him from the fellowship of men and changed him into the likeness of a beast. Indeed, his hand is not shortened that He cannot free His people from tyrants. For by Isaiah (14:3) He promised to give his people rest from their labours and lashings and harsh slavery in which they had formerly served; and by Ezekiel (34:10) He says: “I will deliver my flock from their mouth,” i.e. from the mouth of shepherds who feed themselves.
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<td>Sed ut hoc beneficium populus a Deo consequi mereatur, debet a peccatis cessare, quia in ultionem peccati divina permissione impii accipiunt principatum, dicente domino per Oseam: dabo tibi regem in furore meo; et in Iob dicitur quod regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi. Tollenda est igitur culpa, ut cesset a tyrannorum plaga.
<td>[52] But to deserve to secure this benefit from God, the people must desist from sin, for it is by divine permission that wicked men receive power to rule as a punishment for sin, as the Lord says by the Prophet Hosea [13:11]: “I will give you a king in my wrath” and it is said in Job (34:30) that he “makes a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people.” Sin must therefore be done away with in order that the scourge of tyrants may cease.
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<td><b>Caput 8<br>
Quid praecipue movere debeat regem ad regendum, utrum honor, vel gloria. Opiniones circa hoc, et quid sit tenendum</b>
<td>
<a name="8" id="8"><b>CHAPTER 8<br>
THAT MUNDANE HONOUR AND GLORY ARE NOT AN ADEQUATE REWARD FOR A KING</b></a>
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<td>Quoniam autem, secundum praedicta, regis est bonum multitudinis quaerere, nimis videtur onerosum regis officium nisi ei aliquod proprium bonum ex hoc proveniret. Oportet igitur considerare, in qua re sit boni regis conveniens praemium.
<td>[53] Since, according to what has been said thus far, it is the king’s duty to seek the good of the multitude, the task of a king may seem too burdensome unless some advantage to himself should result from it. It is fitting therefore to consider wherein a suitable reward for a good king is to be found.
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<td>Quibusdam igitur visum est non esse aliud nisi honorem et gloriam, unde et Tullius in libro de republica definit principem civitatis esse alendum gloria; cuius rationem Aristoteles in Lib. Ethic. assignare videtur, quia princeps, cui non sufficit honor et gloria, consequenter tyrannus efficitur. Inest enim animis omnium, ut proprium bonum quaerant. Si ergo contentus non fuerit princeps gloria et honore, quaeret voluptates et divitias, et sic ad rapinas et subditorum iniurias convertetur.
<td>[541 By some men this reward was considered to be nothing other than honour and glory. Whence Tullius says in the book On the Republic [ <i>De Republica</i> V, 7, 9]: “The prince of the city should be nourished by glory,” and Aristotle seems to assign the reason for this in his Book on <i>Ethics</i> [V, 10: 1134b 7]: “because the prince for whom honour and glory is not sufficient consequently turns into tyrant.” For it is in the hearts of all men to seek their proper good. Therefore, if the prince is not content with glory and honour, he will seek pleasures an riches and so will resort to plundering and injuring his subjects.
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<td>Sed si hanc sententiam receperimus, plurima sequuntur inconvenientia. Primo namque hoc regibus dispendiosum esset, si tot labores et sollicitudines paterentur pro mercede tam fragili. Nihil enim videtur in rebus humanis fragilius gloria et honore favoris hominum, cum dependeat ex opinionibus hominum, quibus nihil mutabilius in vita hominum: et inde est quod Isaias propheta huiusmodi gloriam nominat florem foeni.
<td>[55] However, if we accept this opinion a great many incongruous results follow. In the first place, it would be costly to kings if so many labours and anxieties were to be endured for a reward so perishable, for nothing, it seems, is more perishable among human things than the glory and honour of men’s favour since it depends upon the report of men and their opinions, than which nothing in human life is more fickle. And this is why the Prophet Isaiah calls such glory “the flower of grass.”
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<td>Deinde humanae gloriae cupido animi magnitudinem aufert. Qui enim favorem hominum quaerit, necesse est ut in omni eo quod dicit aut facit eorum voluntati deserviat, et sic dum placere hominibus studet, fit servus singulorum. Propter quod et idem Tullius in Lib. de officiis, cavendam dicit gloriae cupidinem. Eripit enim animi libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nihil autem principem, qui ad bona peragenda instituitur, magis decet quam animi magnitudo. Est igitur incompetens regis officio humanae gloriae praemium.
<td>[56] Moreover, the desire for human glory takes away greatness of soul. For he who seeks the favour of men must serve their will in all he says and does, and thus, while striving to please all, he becomes a slave to each one. Wherefore the same Tullius says in his book <i>On Duties</i> [ <i>De officiis</i>, I, 20, 68] that “the inordinate desire for glory is to be guarded against; it takes away freedom of soul, for the sake of which high-minded men should put forth all their efforts.” Indeed there is nothing more becoming to a prince who has been set up for the doing of good works than greatness of soul. Thus, the reward of human glory is not enough for the services of a king.
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<td>Simul etiam est multitudini nocivum, si tale praemium statuatur principibus: pertinet enim ad boni viri officium ut contemnat gloriam, sicut alia temporalia bona. Virtuosi enim et fortis animi est pro iustitia contemnere gloriam sicut et vitam: unde fit quiddam mirabile, ut quia virtuosos actus sequitur gloria, ipsa gloria virtuose contemnatur, et ex contemptu gloriae homo gloriosus reddatur, secundum sententiam Fabii dicentis: gloriam qui spreverit, veram habebit; et de Catone dixit Salustius: quo minus petebat gloriam, tanto magis assequebatur illam; ipsique Christi discipuli se sicut Dei ministros exhibebant per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam. Non est igitur boni viri conveniens praemium gloria, quam contemnunt boni. Si igitur hoc solum bonum statuatur praemium principibus, sequetur bonos viros non assumere principatum, aut si assumpserint, impraemiatos esse.
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[57] At the same time it also hurts the multitude if such a reward be set up for princes, for it is the duty of a good man to take no account of glory, just as he should take no account of other temporal goods. It is the mark of a virtuous and brave soul to despise glory as he despises life, for justice’ sake: whence the strange thing results that glory ensues from virtuous acts, and out of virtue glory itself is despised: and therefore, through his very contempt for glory, a man is made glorious—according to the sentence of Fabius: <a href="javascript:WPShow('WPFootnote14',%20WPFootnote14%20)"><img src="footnoteicon.gif" alt="Footnote" width="16" height="14" border="0"></a>
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</script> “He who scorns glory shall have true glory,” and as Sallust [ <i>Bellum Catilinae</i> 54, 6] says of Cato: “The less he sought glory the more he achieved it.” Even the disciples of Christ “exhibited themselves as the ministers of God in honour and dishonour, in evil report and good report” (2 Cor 6:8). Glory is, therefore, not a fitting reward for a good man; good men spurn it. And, if it alone be set up as the reward for princes, it will follow that good men will not take upon themselves the chief office of the city, or if they take it, they will go unrewarded.
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<td>Amplius: ex cupidine gloriae periculosa mala proveniunt. Multi enim dum immoderate gloriam in rebus bellicis quaerunt, se ac suos perdiderunt exercitus, libertate patriae sub hostili potestate redacta: unde Torquatus, Romanus princeps, in exemplo huius vitandi discriminis, filium, qui contra imperium suum provocatus ab hoste iuvenili ardore pugnavit, licet vicisset, occidit, ne plus mali esset in praesumptionis exemplo, quam utilitatis in gloria hostis occisi.
<td>[58] Furthermore, dangerous evils come from the desire for glory. Many have been led unrestrainedly to seek glory in warfare, and have sent their armies and themselves to destruction, while the freedom of their country was turned into servitude under an enemy. Consider Torquatus, the Roman chief. In order to impress upon the people how imperative it is to avoid such danger, “he slew his own son who, being challenged by an enemy, had, through youthful impetuosity, fought and vanquished him. Yet he had done so contrary to orders given him by his father. Torquatus acted thus, lest more harm should accrue from the example of his son’s presumption than advantage from the glory of slaying the enemy.” [Cf. Augustine, <i>De civ. Dei</i>, V, 18.]
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<td>Habet etiam cupido gloriae aliud sibi familiare vitium, simulationem videlicet. Quia enim difficile est paucisque contingit veras virtutes assequi, quibus solis honor debetur, multi gloriam cupientes, virtutum simulatores fiunt. Propter quod, sicut dicit Salustius: ambitio multos mortales falsos fieri coegit. Aliud clausum in pectore, aliud promptum habere in lingua, magisque vultum quam ingenium habere. Sed et salvator noster eos, qui bona opera faciunt, ut ab hominibus videantur, hypocritas, id est simulatores, vocat. Sicut igitur periculosum est multitudini si princeps voluptates et divitias quaerat pro praemio, ne raptor et contumeliosus fiat; ita periculosum est cum detinetur gloriae praemio, ne praesumptuosus et simulator existat.
<td>[59] Moreover, the desire for glory has another vice akin to it, namely, hypocrisy. Since it is difficult to acquire true virtues, to which alone honour and glory are due, and it is therefore the lot of but a few to attain them, many who desire glory become simulators of virtue. On this account, as Sallust says [ <i>Bellum Catilinae</i> 10, 5]: “Ambition drives many mortals to become false. They keep one thing shut up in their heart, another ready on the tongue, and they have more countenance than character.” But our Saviour also calls those persons hypocrites, or simulators, who do good works that they may be seen by men. Therefore, just as there is danger for the multitude, if the prince seek pleasures and riches as his reward, that he become a plunderer and abusive, so there is danger, if glory be assigned to him as reward, that he become presumptuous and a hypocrite.
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<td>Sed quantum ex dictorum sapientium intentione apparet, non ea ratione honorem et gloriam pro praemio principi decreverunt, tanquam ad hoc principaliter ferri debeat boni regis intentio, sed quia tolerabilius est si gloriam quaerat, quam si pecuniam cupiat, vel voluptatem sequatur. Hoc enim vitium virtuti propinquius est, cum gloria, quam homines cupiunt, ut ait Augustinus, nihil aliud sit quam iudicium hominum bene de hominibus opinantium. Cupido enim gloriae aliquod habet virtutis vestigium, dum saltem bonorum approbationem quaerit et eis displicere recusat. Paucis igitur ad veram virtutem pervenientibus, tolerabilius videtur si praeferatur ad regimen qui, vel iudicium hominum metuens, a malis manifestis retrahitur. Qui enim gloriam cupit, aut vera via per virtutis opera nititur ut ab hominibus approbetur, vel saltem dolis ad hoc contendit atque fallaciis. At qui dominari desiderat, si cupiditate gloriae carens non timeat bene iudicantibus displicere, per apertissima scelera quaerit plerumque obtinere quod diligit, unde bestias superat sive crudelitatis sive luxuriae vitiis, sicut in Nerone Caesare patet, cuius, ut Augustinus dicit, tanta luxuria fuit ut nihil putaretur ab eo virile metuendum, tanta crudelitas ut nihil molle habere putaretur. Hoc autem satis exprimitur per id quod Aristoteles de magnanimo in Ethic. dicit, quod non quaerit honorem et gloriam quasi aliquid magnum quod sit virtutis sufficiens praemium, sed nihil ultra hoc ab hominibus exigit. Hoc enim inter omnia terrena videtur esse praecipuum, ut homini ab hominibus testimonium de virtute reddatur.
<td>[60] Looking at what the above-mentioned wise men intended to say, they do not seem to have decided upon honour and glory as the reward of a prince because they judged that the king’s intention should be principally directed to that object, but because it is more tolerable for him to seek glory than to desire money or pursue pleasure. For this vice is akin to virtue inasmuch as the glory which men desire, as Augustine says [ <i>De civ. Dei</i> V, 12], is nothing else than the judgment of men who think well of men. So the desire for glory has some trace of virtue in it, at least so long as it seeks the approval of good men and is reluctant to displease them. Therefore, since few men reach true virtue, it seems more tolerable if one be set up to rule who, fearing the judgment of men, is restrained from manifest evils. For the man” who desires glory either endeavours to win the approval of men in the true way, by deeds of virtue, or at least strives for this by fraud and deceit. But if the one who desires to domineer lacks the desire for glory, he will have no fear of offending men of good judgment and will commonly strive to obtain what he chooses by the most open crimes. Thus he will surpass the beasts in the vices of cruelty and lust, as is evidenced in the case of the Emperor Nero, who was so effete, as Augustine says [ <i>loc. cit.</i> ], “that he despised everything virile, and yet so cruel that nobody would have thought him to be effeminate.” Indeed all this is quite clearly contained in what Aristotle says in his <i>Ethics</i> [IV, 7:1124a 16] regarding the magnanimous man: True, he does seek honour and glory, but not as something great which could be a sufficient reward of virtue. And beyond this he demands nothing more of men, for among all earthly goods the chief good, it seems, is this, that men bear testimony to the virtue of a man.
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<td><b>Caput 9<br>
Qualis est verus finis regis, qui movere debet ipsum ad bene regendum</b>
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<a name="9" id="9"><b>CHAPTER 9<br>
THAT THE KING SHOULD LOOK TO GOD FOR ADEQUATE REWARD</b></a>
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<td>Quoniam ergo mundanus honor et hominum gloria regiae sollicitudini non est sufficiens praemium, inquirendum restat quale sit eidem sufficiens.
<td>[61] Therefore, since worldly honour and human glory are not a sufficient reward for royal cares, it remains to inquire what sort of reward is sufficient.
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<td>Est autem conveniens ut rex praemium expectet a Deo. Minister enim pro suo ministerio praemium expectat a domino; rex autem, populum gubernando, minister Dei est, dicente apostolo quod omnis potestas a domino Deo est, et quod est Dei minister vindex in iram ei qui male agit; et in Lib. Sap. reges Dei esse ministri describuntur. Debent igitur reges pro suo regimine praemium expectare a Deo. Remunerat autem Deus pro suo ministerio reges interdum temporalibus bonis, sed talia praemia sunt bonis malisque communia; unde dominus Ezech. dicit: Nabuchodonosor rex Babylonis servire fecit exercitum suum servitute magna adversus Tyrum, et merces non est reddita ei nec exercitui eius de Tyro, pro servitute qua servivit mihi adversus eam, ea scilicet servitute qua potestas, secundum apostolum, Dei minister est, vindex in iram ei qui male agit; et postea de praemio subdidit: propterea haec dicit dominus Deus: ecce ego dabo Nabuchodonosor regem Babylonis in terra Aegypti, et diripiet spolia eius, et erit merces exercitui eius. Si ergo reges iniquos contra Dei hostes pugnantes, licet non intentione serviendi Deo sed sua odia et cupiditates exequendi, tanta mercede dominus remunerat ut de hostibus victoriam tribuat, regna subiiciat et spolia diripienda proponat, quid faciet bonis regibus, qui pia intentione Dei populum regunt et hostes impugnant? Non quidem terrenam, sed aeternam mercedem eis promittit, nec in alio quam in se ipso, dicente Petro pastoribus populi Dei: pascite qui in vobis est gregem domini, ut cum venerit princeps pastorum, id est rex regum, Christus, percipiatis immarcescibilem gloriae coronam, de qua dicit Isaias: erit dominus sertum exultationis et diadema gloriae populo suo.
<td>[62] It is proper that a king look to God for his reward, for a servant looks to his master for the reward of his service. The king is indeed the minister of God in governing the people, as the Apostle says: “All power is from the Lord God” (Rom 13:1) and God’s minister is “an avenger to execute wrath upon him who does evil” (Rom 13:4). And in the Book of Wisdom (6:5), kings are described as being ministers of God. Consequently, kings ought to look to God for the reward of their ruling. Now God sometimes rewards kings for their service by temporal goods, but such rewards are common to both the good and the wicked. Wherefore the Lord says to Ezechiel (29:18): “Nabuchodonosor, king of Babylon, has made his army to undergo hard service against Tyre, and there has been no reward given him nor his army for Tyre, for the service he rendered Me against it,” for that service namely, by which, according to the Apostle, power is “the minister of God and the avenger to execute wrath upon him who does evil.” Afterwards He adds, regarding the reward: “Therefore, thus says the Lord God, ‘I will set Nabuchodonosor the king of Babylon in the land of Egypt, and he shall rifle the spoils thereof, and it shall be wages for his army.’” Therefore, if God recompenses wicked kings who fight against the enemies of God, though not with the intention of serving Him but to execute their own hatred and cupidity, by giving them such great rewards as to yield them victory over their foes, subject kingdoms to their sway and grant them spoils to rifle, what will He do for kings who rule the people of God and assail His enemies from a holy motive? He promises them not an earthly reward indeed but an everlasting one and in none other than in Himself. As Peter says to the shepherds of the people (1 Pet 5:2,4): “Feed the flock of God that is among you and when the prince of pastors shall appear (i.e. the King of kings, Christ) you shall receive a never-fading crown of glory,” concerning which Isaiah says (28:5): “The Lord shall be a crown of glory and a garland of joy to His people.”
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<td>Hoc autem ratione manifestatur. Est enim mentibus omnium ratione utentium inditum, virtutis praemium beatitudinem esse. Virtus enim uniuscuiusque rei describitur, quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Ad hoc autem quisque bene operando nititur pervenire, quod est maxime desiderio inditum; hoc autem est esse felicem, quod nullus potest non velle. Hoc igitur praemium virtutis convenienter expectatur quod hominem beatum facit. Si autem bene operari virtutis est opus, regis autem opus est bene regere subditos, hoc etiam erit praemium regis, quod eum faciat esse beatum. Quid autem hoc sit, hinc considerandum est. Beatitudinem quidem dicimus ultimum desideriorum finem. Neque enim desiderii motus usque in infinitum procedit; esset enim inane naturale desiderium, cum infinita pertransiri non possint. Cum autem desiderium intellectualis naturae sit universalis boni, hoc solum bonum vere beatum facere poterit, quo adepto nullum bonum restat quod amplius desiderari possit: unde et beatitudo dicitur bonum perfectum, quasi omnia desiderabilia in se comprehendens. Tale autem non est aliquod bonum terrenum: nam qui divitias habent, amplius habere desiderant, et simile patet in caeteris. Et si ampliora non quaerunt, desiderant tamen ut ea permaneant, vel alia in locum eorum succedant. Nihil enim permanens invenitur in rebus terrenis, nihil igitur terrenum est quod quietare desiderium possit. Neque igitur terrenum aliquod beatum facere potest, ut possit esse regis conveniens praemium.
<td>[63] This is also clearly shown by reason. It is implanted in the minds of all who have the use of reason that the reward of virtue is happiness. The virtue of anything whatsoever is explained to be that which makes its possessor good and renders his deed good. Moreover, everyone strives by working well to attain that which is most deeply implanted in desire, namely, to be happy. This, no one is able not to wish. It is therefore fitting to expect as a reward for virtue that which makes man happy. Now, if to work well is a virtuous deed, and the king’s work is to rule his people well, then that which makes him happy will be the king’s reward. What this is has now to be considered.” Happiness, we say, is the ultimate end of our desires. Now the movement of desire does not go on to infinity else natural desire would be vain, for infinity cannot be traversed. Since, then, the desire of an intellectual nature is for universal good, that good alone can make it truly happy which, when attained, leaves no further good to be desired. Whence happiness is called the perfect good inasmuch as it comprises in itself all things desirable. But no earthly good is such a good. They who have riches desire to have more, they who enjoy pleasure desire to enjoy more, and the like is clear for the rest: and if they do not seek more, they at least desire that those they have should abide or that others should follow in their stead. For nothing permanent is found in earthly things. Consequently there is nothing earthly which can calm desire. Thus, nothing earthly can make man happy, so that it may be a fitting reward for a king.
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<td>Adhuc: cuiuslibet rei finalis perfectio et bonum completum ab aliquo superiore dependet, quia et ipsa corporalia meliora redduntur ex adiunctione meliorum, peiora vero, si deterioribus misceantur. Si enim argento misceatur aurum, argentum fit melius, quod ex plumbi admixtione impurum efficitur. Constat autem terrena omnia esse infra mentem humanam. Beatitudo autem est hominis finalis perfectio et bonum completum ad quod omnes pervenire desiderant. Nihil igitur terrenum est quod hominem possit beatum facere; nec igitur terrenum aliquod est praemium regis sufficiens. Non enim, ut Augustinus dicit, Christianos principes ideo felices dicimus, quia diutius imperarunt, vel imperatores filios morte placida reliquerunt, vel hostes reipublicae domuerunt, vel cives adversum se insurgentes et cavere et opprimere potuerunt; sed felices eos dicimus si iuste imperant, si malunt cupiditatibus potius quam gentibus quibuslibet imperare, si omnia faciunt non propter ardorem inanis gloriae, sed propter charitatem felicitatis aeternae. Tales imperatores Christianos felices dicimus, interim spe, postea re ipsa futuros, cum id quod expectamus advenerit. Sed nec aliquid aliud creatum est, quod beatum hominem faciat et possit regi decerni pro praemio. Tendit enim uniuscuiusque rei desiderium in suum principium, a quo esse suum causatur. Causa vero mentis humanae non est aliud quam Deus, qui eam ad suam imaginem facit. Solus igitur Deus est qui hominis desiderium quietare potest, et facere hominem beatum, et esse regi conveniens praemium.
<td>[64] Again, the last perfection and perfect good of anything one chooses depends upon something higher, for even bodily things are made better by the addition of better things and worse by being mixed with baser things. If gold is mingled with silver, the silver is made better, while by an admixture of lead it is rendered impure. Now it is manifest that all earthly things are beneath the human mind. But happiness is the last perfection and the perfect good of man, which all men desire to reach. Therefore there is no earthly thing which could make man happy, nor is any earthly thing a sufficient reward for a king. For, as Augustine” says, “we do not call Christian princes happy merely because they have reigned a long time, or because after a peaceful death they have left their sons to rule, or because they subdued the enemies of the state, or because they were able to guard against or to suppress citizens who rose up against them. Rather do we call them happy if they rule justly, if they prefer to rule their passions rather than nations, and if they do all things not for the love of vainglory but for the love of eternal happiness. Such Christian emperors we say are happy, now in hope, afterwards in very fact when that which we await shall come to pass. But neither is there any other created thing which would make a man happy and which could be set up as the reward for a king. For the desire of each thing tends towards its source, whence is the cause of its being. But the cause of the human soul is none other than God Who made it to His own image. Therefore it is God alone Who can still the desires of man and make him happy and be the fitting reward for a king.
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<td>Amplius: mens humana universalis boni cognoscitiva est per intellectum, et desiderativa per voluntatem; bonum autem universale non invenitur nisi in Deo. Nihil ergo est quod possit hominem beatum facere, eius implendo desiderium, nisi Deus, de quo dicitur in Psalm.: qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum; in hoc ergo rex suum praemium statuere debet. Hoc igitur considerans David rex dicebat: quid mihi est in caelo et a te quid volui super terram? Cui quaestioni postea respondens, subiungit: mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est et ponere in domino Deo spem meam. Ipse enim est qui dat salutem regibus, non solum temporalem, qua communiter salvat homines et iumenta, sed etiam eam de qua, per Isaiam dicit: salus autem mea in sempiternum erit, qua homines salvat, eos ad aequalitatem Angelorum perducens.
<td>[65] Furthermore, the human mind knows the universal good through the intellect, and desires it through the will: but the universal good is not found except in God. Therefore there is nothing which could make man happy, fulfilling his every desire, but God, of Whom it is said in the Psalm (102:5): “Who satisfies your desire with good things.” In this, therefore, should the king place his reward. Wherefore, King David,” with this in mind, said (Ps 72:25,28): “What have I in heaven? And besides You what do I desire upon earth?” and he afterwards adds in answer to this question: “It is good for me to adhere to my God and to put my hope in the Lord God.” For it is He Who gives salvation to kings, not merely temporal salvation by which He saves both men and beasts together, but also that salvation of which He says by the mouth of Isaiah (51:6): “But my salvation shall be for ever,” that salvation by which He saves man and makes them equal to the angels.
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<td>Sic igitur verificari potest quod regis praemium sit honor et gloria. Quis enim mundanus et caducus honor huic honori similis esse potest, ut homo sit civis et domesticus Dei, et inter Dei filios computatus haereditatem regni caelestis assequatur cum Christo? Hic est honor quem concupiscens et admirans rex David dicebat: nimis honorati sunt amici tui, Deus. Quae insuper humanae laudis gloria huic comparari potest, quam non fallax blandientium lingua, non decepta hominum opinio profert, sed ex interioris conscientiae testimonio producitur et Dei testimonio confirmatur, qui suis confessoribus repromittit quod confiteatur eos in gloria patris coram Angelis Dei? Qui autem hanc gloriam quaerunt, eam inveniunt, et quam non quaerunt gloriam hominum, consequuntur, exemplo Salomonis, qui non solum sapientiam, quam quaesivit, accepit a domino, sed factus est super reges alios gloriosus.
<td>[66] It can thus also be verified that the reward of the king is honour and glory. What worldly and frail honour can indeed be likened to this honour that a man be made a “citizen with the Saints and a kinsman of God” (Eph 2:19), numbered among the sons of God, and that he obtain the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom with Christ? This is the honour of which King David, in desire and wonder, says (Ps 138:17): “Your friends, O God, are made exceedingly honourable.” And further, what glory of human praise can be compared to this, not uttered by the false tongue of flatterers nor the fallacious opinion of men, but issuing from the witness of our inmost conscience and confirmed by the testimony of God, Who promises to those who confess Him that He will confess them before the Angels of God in the glory of the Father? They who seek this glory will find it and they will win the glory of men which they do not seek: witness Solomon, who not only received from the Lord wisdom which he sought, but was made glorious above other kings.
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<td><b>Caput 10<br>
Quod praemium regum et principum tenet supremum gradum in beatitudine caelesti, multis rationibus ostenditur et exemplis</b>
<td>
<a name="10" id="10"><b>CHAPTER 10<br>
WHAT DEGREE OF HEAVENLY BEATITUDE THE KING MAY OBTAIN</b></a>
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<td>Considerandum autem restat ulterius, quod et eminentem obtinebunt caelestis beatitudinis gradum, qui officium regium digne et laudabiliter exequuntur.
<td>[67] Now it remains further to consider that they who discharge the kingly office worthily and laudably will obtain an elevated and outstanding degree of heavenly happiness.
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<td>Si enim beatitudo virtutis est praemium, consequens est ut maiori virtuti maior gradus beatitudinis debeatur. Est autem praecipua virtus, qua homo aliquis non solum se ipsum sed etiam alios dirigere potest; et tanto magis, quanto plurium est regitiva: quia et secundum virtutem corporalem tanto aliquis virtuosior reputatur, quanto plures vincere potest, aut pondera plura levare. Sic igitur maior virtus requiritur ad regendum domesticam familiam, quam ad regendum se ipsum, multoque maior ad regimen civitatis et regni. Est igitur excellentis virtutis bene regium officium exercere; debetur igitur ei excellens in beatitudine praemium.
<td>[68] For if happiness is the reward of virtue, it follows that a higher degree of happiness is due to greater virtue. Now, that indeed is signal virtue by which a man can guide not only himself but others, and the more persons he rules the greater his virtue. Similarly, in regard to bodily strength, a man is reputed to be more powerful the more adversaries he can beat or the more weights he can lift. Thus, greater virtue is required to rule a household than to rule one’s self, and much greater to rule a city and a kingdom. To discharge well the office of a king is therefore a work of extraordinary virtue. To it, therefore, is due an extraordinary reward of happiness.
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<td>Adhuc: in omnibus artibus et potentiis laudabiliores sunt qui alios bene regunt, quam qui secundum alienam directionem bene se habent. In speculativis enim maius est veritatem aliis docendo tradere, quam quod ab aliis docetur capere posse. In artificiis etiam maius existimatur maiorique conducitur pretio architector, qui aedificium disponit, quam artifex, qui secundum eius dispositionem manualiter operatur. Et in rebus bellicis maiorem gloriam de victoria consequitur prudentia ducis, quam militis fortitudo. Sic autem se habet rector multitudinis in his quae a singulis secundum virtutem sunt agenda, sicut doctor in disciplinis et architector in aedificiis et dux in bellis. Est igitur rex maiori praemio dignus, si bene subiectos gubernaverit, quam aliquis subditorum, si sub rege bene se habuerit.
<td>[69] Again, those who rule others well are more worthy of praise than those who act well under others’ direction. This applies to the field of all arts and sciences. In the speculative sciences, for instance, it is nobler to impart truth to others by teaching than to be able to grasp what is taught by others. So, too, in matters of the crafts, an architect who plans a building is more highly esteemed and paid a higher wage than is the builder who does the manual labour under his direction; also, in warfare the strategy of the general wins greater glory from victory than the bravery of the soldier. Now the ruler of a multitude stands in the same relation to the virtuous deeds performed by each individual as the teacher to the matters taught the architect to the buildings, and the general to the wars. Consequently, the king is worthy of a greater reward if he governs his subjects well than any of his subjects who act well under him.
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<td>Amplius: si virtutis est, ut per eam opus hominis bonum reddatur, maioris virtutis esse videtur quod maius bonum per eam aliquis operetur. Maius autem et divinius est bonum multitudinis quam bonum unius: unde interdum malum unius sustinetur si in bonum multitudinis cedat, sicut occiditur latro ut pax multitudini detur. Et ipse Deus mala esse in mundo non sineret nisi ex eis bona eliceret ad utilitatem et pulchritudinem universi. Pertinet autem ad regis officium ut bonum multitudinis studiose procuret. Maius igitur praemium debetur regi pro bono regimine quam subdito pro bona actione.
<td>[70] Further, if it is the part of virtue to render a man’s work good, it is, it seems, from greater virtue that one does greater good. But the good of the multitude is greater and more divine than the good of one man. Wherefore the evil of one man is sometimes endured if it redounds to the good of the multitude, as when a robber is killed to bring peace to the multitude. God Himself would not allow evils to be in the world were it not for the fact that He brings good out of them for the advantage and beauty of the universe. Now it belongs to the office of the king to have zealous concern for the good of the multitude. Therefore a greater reward is due to the king for good ruling than to the subject for acting according to rule.
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<td>Hoc autem manifestius fiet, si quis magis in speciali consideret. Laudatur enim ab hominibus quaevis privata persona, et ei a Deo computatur in praemium, si egenti subveniat, si discordes pacificet, si oppressum a potentiore eripiat, denique si alicui qualitercumque opem vel consilium conferat ad salutem. Quanto igitur magis laudandus est ab hominibus et praemiandus a Deo, qui totam provinciam facit pace gaudere, violentias cohibet, iustitiam servat, et disponit quid sit agendum ab hominibus suis legibus et praeceptis?
<td>[71] This will become clearer if considered in greater detail. For a private person is praised by men, and his deed reckoned for reward by God, if he helps the needy, brings peace to those in discord, rescues one oppressed by a mightier; in a word, if in any way he gives to another assistance or advice for his welfare How much the more, then, is he to be praised by men and rewarded by God who makes a whole province rejoice in peace, who restrains violence, preserves justice and arranges by his laws and precepts what is to be done by men?
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<td>Hinc etiam magnitudo regiae virtutis apparet, quod praecipue Dei similitudinem gerit, dum agit in regno quod Deus in mundo: unde et in Exod. iudices multitudinis dii vocantur. Imperatores etiam apud Romanos dii vocabantur. Tanto autem est aliquid Deo acceptius, quanto magis ad eius imitationem accedit: unde et apostolus monet: estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii charissimi. Sed si, secundum sapientis sententiam, omne animal diligit simile sibi, secundum quod causae aliqualiter similitudinem habent causati, consequens igitur est bonos reges Deo esse acceptissimos, et ab eo maxime praemiandos.
<td>[72] The greatness of kingly virtue also appears in this, that he bears a special likeness to God, since he does in his kingdom what God does in the world; wherefore in Exodus (22:9) the judges of the people are called gods, and also among the Romans the emperors received the appellative <i>Divus</i>. Now the more a thing approaches to the likeness of God the more acceptable it is to Him. Hence, also, the Apostle urges (Eph 5:1): “Be therefore imitators of God as most dear children.” But if according to the saying of the Wise Man (Sirach 13:9), every beast loves its like inasmuch as causes bear some likeness to the caused, it follows that good kings are most pleasing to God and are to be most highly rewarded by Him.
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<td>Simul etiam, ut Gregorii verbis utar: quid est tempestas maris, nisi tempestas mentis? Quieto autem mari recte navem etiam imperitus dirigit, turbato autem mari tempestatis fluctibus etiam peritus nauta confunditur: unde et plerumque in occupatione regiminis, ipse quoque boni operis usus perditur, qui in tranquillitate tenebatur. Valde enim difficile est si, ut Augustinus dicit, inter linguas sublimantium et honorantium, et obsequia nimis humiliter salutantium non extollantur, sed se homines esse meminerint. Et in Eccli.: beatus vir qui post aurum non abiit, nec speravit in pecuniae thesauris. Qui potuit impune transgredi et non est transgressus, facere mala et non fecit. Ex quo quasi in virtutis opere probatus invenitur fidelis, unde secundum Biantis proverbium: principatus virum ostendit. Multi enim ad principatus culmen pervenientes, a virtute deficiunt, qui, dum in statu essent infimo, virtuosi videbantur. Ipsa igitur difficultas quae principibus imminet ad bene agendum, eos facit maiori praemio dignos, et si aliquando per infirmitatem peccaverint, apud homines excusabiliores redduntur et facilius a Deo veniam promerentur, si tamen, ut Augustinus ait pro suis peccatis humilitatis et miserationis et orationis sacrificium Deo suo vero immolare non negligunt. In cuius rei exemplum de Achab, rege Israel, qui multum peccaverat, dominus ad Heliam dixit: quia humiliatus est Achab, non inducam hoc malum in diebus suis.
<td>[73] Likewise, if I may use the words of Gregory [ <i>Regula Pastoralis</i> I, 9]: “What else is it (for a king) to be at the pinnacle of power if not to find himself in a mental storm? When the sea is calm even an inexperienced man can steer a ship straight; when the sea is troubled by stormy waves, even an experienced sailor is bewildered. Whence it frequently happens that in the business of government the practice of good works is lost which in tranquil times was maintained.” For, as Augustine says [ <i>De civ. Dei</i> V, 24], it is very difficult for rulers “not to be puffed up amid flattering and honouring tongues and the obsequiousness of those who bow too humbly, but to remember that they are men.” It is said also in Sirach (31:8,10): “Blessed is the rich man who has not gone after gold nor put his trust in money nor in treasures, who could have transgressed with impunity and did not transgress, who could do evil and did not do it.” Wherefore, having been tried in the work of virtue, he is found faithful and so, according to the proverb of Bias [Aristotle, <i>Eth. Nic.</i> V, 3: 1130a 1]: “Authority shows the man.” For many who seemed virtuous while they were in lowly state fall from virtue when they reach the pinnacle of power. The very difficulty, then, of acting well, which besets kings, makes them more worthy of greater reward; and if through weakness they sometimes do amiss, they are rendered more excusable before men and more easily obtain forgiveness from God provided, as Augustine says (<i>De civ. Dei</i>, V, 24), they do not neglect to offer up to their true God the sacrifice of humility, mercy, and prayer for their sins. As an example of this, the Lord said to Elias concerning Achab, king of Israel, who had sinned a great deal: “Because he has humbled himself for My sake, I will not bring the evil in his days.”
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<td>Non autem solum ratione ostenditur quod regibus excellens praemium debeatur, sed etiam auctoritate divina firmatur. Dicitur enim in Zachar. quod in illa beatitudinis die qua erit dominus protector habitantibus in Hierusalem, id est in visione pacis aeternae, aliorum domus erunt sicut domus David, quia scilicet omnes reges erunt et regnabunt cum Christo, sicut membra cum capite; sed domus David erit sicut domus Dei, quia sicut regendo fideliter Dei officium gessit in populo, ita in praemio Deo propinquius erit et inhaerebit. Hoc etiam fuit apud gentiles aliqualiter somniatum, dum civitatum rectores atque servatores in deos transformari putabant.
<td>[74] That a very high reward is due to kings is not only demonstrated by reason but is also confirmed by divine authority. It is said in the prophecy of Zachariah (12:8) that, in that day of blessedness wherein God will be the protector of the inhabitants of Jerusalem (i.e. in the vision of eternal peace), the houses of others will be as the house of David, because all will then be kings and reign with Christ as the members with their head. But the house of David will be as the house of God, because just as he carried out the work of God among the people by ruling faithfully, so in his reward he will adhere more closely to God. Likewise, among the Gentiles this was dimly realized, as in a dream, for they thought to transform into gods the rulers and preservers of their cities.
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<td><b>Caput 11<br>
Quod rex et princeps studere debet ad bonum regimen propter bonum sui ipsius et utile quod inde sequitur; cuius contrarium sequitur regimen tyrannicum</b>
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<a name="11" id="11"><b>CHAPTER 11<br>
WHAT ADVANTAGES WHICH ARE RENDERED TO KINGS ARE LOST BY THE TYRANT</b></a>
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<td>Cum regibus tam grande in caelesti beatitudine praemium proponatur si bene in regendo se habuerint, diligenti cura se ipsos observare debent ne in tyrannidem convertantur. Nihil enim eis acceptabilius esse debet quam quod ex honore regio, quo sublimantur in terris, in caelestis regni gloriam transferantur. Errant vero tyranni, qui propter quaedam terrena commoda iustitiam deserunt; qui tanto privantur praemio, quod adipisci poterant iuste regendo. Quod autem stultum sit pro huiusmodi parvis et temporalibus bonis maxima et sempiterna perdere bona, nullus, nisi stultus aut infidelis, ignorat.
<td>[75] Since such a magnificent reward in heavenly blessedness is in store for kings who have acted well in ruling, they ought to keep careful watch over themselves in order not to turn to tyranny. Nothing, indeed, can be more acceptable to them than to be transferred from the royal honour, to which they are raised on earth, into the glory of the heavenly kingdom. Tyrants, on the contrary, who desert justice for a few earthly advantages, are deprived of such a great reward which they could have obtained by ruling justly. How foolish it is to sacrifice the greatest and eternal goods for trifling, temporal goods is clear to everyone but a fool or an infidel.
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<td>Addendum est etiam quod haec temporalia commoda, propter quae tyranni iustitiam deserunt, magis ad lucrum proveniunt regibus dum iustitiam servant.
<td>[76] It is to be added further, however, that the very temporal advantages for which tyrants abandon justice work to the greater profit of kings when they observe justice.
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<td>Primo namque inter mundana omnia nihil est, quod amicitiae dignae praeferendum videatur. Ipsa namque est quae virtuosos in unum conciliat, virtutem conservat atque promovet. Ipsa est qua omnes indigent in quibuscumque negotiis peragendis, quae nec prosperis importune se ingerit, nec deserit in adversis. Ipsa est quae maximas delectationes affert, in tantum ut quaecumque delectabilia in taedium sine amicis vertantur. Quaelibet autem aspera, facilia et prope nulla facit amor; nec est alicuius tyranni tanta crudelitas, ut amicitia non delectetur. Dionysius enim, quondam Syracusanorum tyrannus, cum duorum amicorum, qui Damon et Pythias dicebantur, alterum occidere vellet, is, qui occidendus erat, inducias impetravit ut domum profectus res suas ordinaret; alter vero amicorum sese tyranno ob fidem pro eius reditu dedit. Appropinquante autem promisso die, nec illo redeunte, unusquisque fideiussorem stultitiae arguebat. At ille nihil se metuere de amici constantia praedicabat. Eadem autem hora, qua fuerat occidendus, rediit. Admirans autem amborum animum, tyrannus supplicium propter fidem amicitiae remisit, insuper rogans ut eum tertium reciperent in amicitiae gradu.
<td>[77] First of all, among all worldly things there is nothing which seems worthy to be preferred to friendship. Friendship unites good men and preserves and promotes virtue. Friendship is needed by all men in whatsoever occupations they engage. In prosperity it does not thrust itself unwanted upon us, nor does it desert us in adversity. It is what brings with it the greatest delight, to such an extent that all that pleases is changed to weariness when friends are absent, and all difficult things are made easy and as nothing by love. There is no tyrant so cruel that friendship does not bring him pleasure. When Dionysius, sometime tyrant of Syracuse, wanted to kill one of two friends, Damon and Pythias, the one who was to be killed asked leave to go home and set his affairs in order, and the other friend surrendered himself to the tyrant as security for his return. When the appointed day was approaching and he had not yet returned, everyone said that his hostage was a fool, but he declared he had no fear whatever regarding his friend’s loyalty. The very hour when he was to be put to death, his friend returned. Admiring the courage of both, the tyrant remitted the sentence on account of the loyalty of their friendship, and asked in addition that they should receive him as a third member in their bond of friendship. [Cf. Valerius Maximus IV, 7, Ext. 1; Vincent of Beauvais, <i>Specul. Doctrinale</i> V, 84.]
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<td>Hoc autem amicitiae bonum, quamvis desiderent tyranni, consequi tamen non possunt. Dum enim commune bonum non quaerunt, sed proprium, fit parva vel nulla communio eorum ad subditos. Omnis autem amicitia super aliqua communione firmatur. Eos enim qui conveniunt, vel per naturae originem, vel per morum similitudinem, vel per cuiuscumque societatis communionem, videmus amicitia coniungi. Parva igitur vel potius nulla est amicitia tyranni et subditi; simulque dum subditi per tyrannicam iniustitiam opprimuntur, et se amari non sentiunt sed contemni, nequaquam amant. Nec habent tyranni unde de subditis conquerantur si ab eis non diliguntur, quia nec ipsi tales se ipsis exhibent ut diligi ab eis debeant. Sed boni reges, dum communi profectui studiose intendunt et eorum studio subditi plura commoda se assequi sentiunt, diliguntur a plurimis, dum subditos se amare demonstrant, quia et hoc est maioris malitiae quam quod in multitudine cadat, ut odio habeantur amici et benefactoribus rependatur malum pro bono.
<td>[78] Yet, although tyrants desire this very benefit of friendship, they cannot obtain it, for when they seek their own good instead of the common good there is little or no communion between them and their subjects. Now all friendship is concluded upon the basis of something common among those who are to be friends, for we see that those are united in friendship who have in common either their natural origin, or some similarity in habits of life, or any kind of social interests. Consequently there can be little or no friendship between tyrants and their subjects. When the latter are oppressed by tyrannical injustice and feel they are not loved but despised, they certainly do not conceive any love, for it is too great a virtue for the common man to love his enemies and to do good to his persecutors. Nor have tyrants any reason to complain of their subjects if they are not loved by them, since they do not act towards them in such a way that they ought to be loved by them. Good kings, on the contrary, are loved by many when they show that they love their subjects and are studiously intent on the common welfare, and when their subjects can see that they derive many benefits from this zealous care. For to hate their friends and return evil for good to their benefactors—this, surely, would be too great a malice to ascribe fittingly to the generality of men.
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<td>Et ex hoc amore provenit ut bonorum regum regnum sit stabile, dum pro ipsis se subditi quibuscumque periculis exponere non recusant: cuius exemplum in Iulio Caesare apparet, de quo Suetonius refert quod milites suos usque adeo diligebat ut, audita quorumdam caede, capillos et barbam ante non dempserit quam vindicasset: quibus rebus devotissimos sibi et strenuissimos milites reddidit, ita quod plerique eorum capti, concessam sibi sub ea conditione vitam, si militare adversus Caesarem vellent, recusarent. Octavianus etiam Augustus, qui modestissime imperio usus est, in tantum diligebatur a subditis ut plerique morientes victimas quas devoverant immolari mandarent, quia eum superstitem reliquissent. Non est ergo facile ut principis perturbetur dominium, quem tanto consensu populus amat: propter quod Salomon dicit: rex qui iudicat in iustitia pauperes, thronus eius in aeternum firmabitur.
<td>[79] The consequence of this love is that the government of good kings is stable, because their subjects do not refuse to expose themselves to any danger whatsoever on behalf of such kings. An example of this is to be seen in Julius Caesar who, as Suetonius relates [ <i>Divus Iulius</i> 67], loved his soldiers to such an extent that when he heard that some of them were slaughtered, “he refused to cut either hair or beard until he had taken vengeance.” In this way, he made his soldiers most loyal to himself as well as most valiant, so that many, on being taken prisoner, refused to accept their lives when offered them on the condition that they serve against Caesar. Octavianus Augustus, also, who was most moderate in his use of power, was so loved by his subjects that some of them “on their deathbeds provided in their wills a thank-offering to be paid by the immolation of animals, so grateful were they that the emperor’s life outlasted their own” [Suetonius, <i>Divus Augustus</i> 59]. Therefore it is no easy task to shake the government of a prince whom the people so unanimously love. This is why Solomon says (Prov 29:14): “The king that judges the poor in justice, his throne shall be established forever.”
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<td>Tyrannorum vero dominium diuturnum esse non potest, cum sit multitudini odiosum. Non potest enim diu conservari quod votis multorum repugnat. Vix enim a quoquam praesens vita transigitur quin aliquas adversitates patiatur. Adversitatis autem tempore, occasio deesse non potest contra tyrannum insurgendi: et ubi adsit occasio, non deerit ex multis vel unus qui occasione non utatur. Insurgentem autem populus votive prosequitur: nec de facili carebit effectu, quod cum favore multitudinis attentatur. Vix ergo potest contingere quod tyranni dominium protendatur in longum.
<td>[80] The government of tyrants, on the other hand, cannot last long because it is hateful to the multitude, and what is against the wishes of the multitude cannot be long preserved. For a man can hardly pass through this present life without suffering some adversities, and in the time of his adversity occasion cannot be lacking to rise against the tyrant; and when there is an opportunity there will not be lacking at least one of the multitude to use it. Then the people will fervently favour the insurgent, and what is attempted with the sympathy of the multitude will not easily fail of its effects. It can thus scarcely come to pass that the government of a tyrant will endure for a long time.
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<td>Hoc etiam manifeste patet, si quis consideret unde tyranni dominium conservatur. Non enim conservatur amore, cum parva vel nulla sit amicitia subiectae multitudinis ad tyrannum, ut ex praehabitis patet. De subditorum autem fide tyrannis confidendum non est. Non enim invenitur tanta virtus in multis, ut fidelitatis virtute reprimantur ne indebitae servitutis iugum, si possint, excutiant. Fortassis autem nec fidelitati contrarium reputabitur secundum opinionem multorum, si tyrannicae nequitiae qualitercumque obvietur. Restat ergo ut solo timore tyranni regimen sustentetur, unde et timeri se a subditis tota intentione procurant. Timor autem est debile fundamentum. Nam qui timore subduntur, si occurrat occasio qua possint impunitatem sperare, contra praesidentes insurgunt eo ardentius quo magis contra voluntatem ex solo timore cohibebantur. Sicut si aqua per violentiam includatur, cum aditum invenerit impetuosius fluit. Sed nec ipse timor caret periculo, cum ex nimio timore plerique in desperationem inciderint. Salutis autem desperatio audacter ad quaelibet attendenda praecipitat. Non potest igitur tyranni dominium esse diuturnum.
<td>[81] This is very clear, too, if we consider the means by which a tyrannical government is upheld. It is not upheld by love, since there is little or no bond of friendship between the subject multitude and the tyrant, as is evident from what we have said. On the other hand, tyrants cannot rely on the loyalty of their subjects, for such a degree of virtue is not found among the generality of men, that they should be restrained by the virtue of fidelity from throwing off the yoke of unmerited servitude, if they are able to do so. Nor would it perhaps be a violation of fidelity at all, according to the opinion of many,’ to frustrate the wickedness of tyrants by any means whatsoever. It remains, then, that the government of a tyrant is maintained by fear alone and consequently they strive with all their might to be feared by their subjects. Fear, however, is a weak support. Those who are kept down by fear will rise against their rulers if the opportunity ever occurs when they can hope to do it with impunity, and they will rebel against their rulers all the more furiously the more they have been kept in subjection against their will by fear alone, just as water confined under pressure flows with greater impetus when. it finds an outlet. That very fear itself is not without danger, because many become desperate from excessive fear, and despair of safety impels a man boldly to dare anything. Therefore the government of a tyrant cannot be of long duration.
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<td>Hoc etiam non minus exemplis quam rationibus apparet. Si quis enim antiquorum gesta et modernorum eventus consideret, vix inveniet dominium tyranni alicuius diuturnum fuisse. Unde et Aristoteles in sua politica, multis tyrannis enumeratis, omnium demonstrat dominium brevi tempore fuisse finitum, quorum tamen aliqui diutius praefuerunt quia non multum in tyrannide excedebant sed quantum ad multa imitabantur regalem modestiam.
<td>[82] This appears clearly from examples no less than from reason. If we scan the history of antiquity and the events of modern times, we shall scarcely find one government of a tyrant which lasted a long time. So Aristotle, in his Politics [V, 12: 1315b 11-39], after enumerating many tyrants, shows that all their governments were of short duration; although some of them reigned a fairly long time because they were not very tyrannical but in many things imitated the moderation of kings.
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<td>Adhuc autem hoc magis fit manifestum ex consideratione divini iudicii. Ut enim in Iob dicitur: regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi. Nullus autem verius hypocrita dici potest quam qui regis assumit officium et exhibet se tyrannum. Nam hypocrita dicitur qui alterius repraesentat personam, sicut in spectaculis fieri consuevit. Sic igitur Deus praefici permittit tyrannos ad puniendum subditorum peccata. Talis autem punitio in Scripturis ira Dei consuevit nominari. Unde per Oseae dominus dicit: dabo vobis regem in furore meo. Infelix est autem rex qui populo in furore Dei conceditur. Non enim eius stabile potest esse dominium, quia non obliviscetur misereri Deus, nec continebit in ira sua misericordias suas: quinimmo per Ioelem dicitur quod est patiens, et multae misericordiae, et praestabilis super malitia. Non igitur permittit Deus diu regnare tyrannos, sed post tempestatem per eos inductam populo, per eorum deiectionem tranquillitatem inducet. Unde sapiens dicit: sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus, et sedere fecit mites pro eis.
<td>[83] All this becomes still more evident if we consider the divine judgment, for, as we read in Job (24:30), “He makes a man who is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people.” No one, indeed, can be more truly called a hypocrite than the man who assumes the office of king and acts like a tyrant, for a hypocrite is one who mimics the person of another, as is done on the stage. Hence God permits tyrants to get into power to punish the sins of the subjects. In Holy Scripture it is customary to call such punishment the anger of God. Thus in Hosea (13:11) the Lord says: “I will give you a king in my wrath.” Unhappy is a king who is given to the people in God’s wrath, for his power cannot be stable, because “God does not forgets to show mercy nor does He shut up His mercies in His anger” (Ps 76:10). On the contrary, as we read in Joel (2:13): “He is patient and rich in mercy and ready to repent of the evil.” So God does not permit tyrants to reign a long time, but after the storm brought on the people through these tyrants, He restores tranquillity by casting them down. Therefore the Wise Man” says (Sirach 10:17): “God has overturned the thrones of proud princes and hath set up the meek in their stead.”
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<td>Experimento etiam apparet quod reges magis per iustitiam adipiscuntur divitias quam per rapinam tyranni. Quia enim dominium tyrannorum subiectae multitudini displicet, ideo opus habent tyranni multos habere satellites per quos contra subditos tuti reddantur, in quibus necesse est plura expendere quam a subditis rapiant. Regum autem dominium, quod subditis placet, omnes subditos pro satellitibus ad custodiam habet, in quibus expendere opus non est; sed interdum in necessitatibus plura regibus sponte donant, quam tyranni diripere possint; et sic impletur quod Salomon dicit: alii, scilicet reges, dividunt propria benefaciendo subiectis, et ditiores fiunt. Alii, scilicet tyranni, rapiunt non sua, et semper in egestate sunt. Similiter autem iusto Dei contingit iudicio ut qui divitias iniuste congregant, inutiliter eas dispergant, aut etiam iuste auferantur ab eis. Ut enim Salomon dicit: avarus non implebitur pecunia, et qui amat divitias fructum non capiet ex eis; quinimmo ut Prov. XV dicit: conturbat domum suam, qui sectatur avaritiam. Regibus vero, qui iustitiam quaerunt, divitiae adduntur a Deo, sicut Salomon, qui, dum sapientiam quaesivit ad faciendum iudicium, promissionem de abundantia divitiarum accepit.
<td>[84] Experience further shows that kings acquire more wealth through justice than tyrants do through rapine. Because the government of tyrants is displeasing to the multitude subject to it, tyrants must have a great many satellites to safeguard themselves against their subjects. On these it is necessary to spend more than they can rob from their subjects. On the contrary, the government of kings, since it is pleasing to their subjects, has for its protection, instead of hirelings, all the subjects. And they demand no pay but, in time of need, freely give to their kings more than the tyrants can take. Thus the words of Solomon are fulfilled (Prov 11:24): “Some (namely, the kings) distribute their own goods (doing good to their subjects) and grow richer; others (namely, the tyrants) take away what is not their own and are always in want.” In the same way it comes to pass, by the just judgment of God, that those who unjustly heap up riches, uselessly scatter them or are justly deprived of them. For, as Solomon says (Eccles. 5:9): “A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money and he who loves riches shall reap no fruit from them.” Rather, we read in Proverbs (15:27): “He who is greedy of gain troubles his own house.” But to kings who seek justice, God gives wealth, as He did to Solomon who, when he sought wisdom to do justice, received a promise of an abundance of wealth.”
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<td>De fama vero superfluum videtur dicere. Quis enim dubitet bonos reges non solum in vita, sed magis post mortem quodammodo laudibus hominum vivere, et in desiderio haberi; malorum vero nomen aut statim deficere, vel si excellentes in malitia fuerint, cum detestatione eorum rememorari? Unde Salomon dicit: memoria iusti cum laudibus, nomen autem impiorum putrescet, quia vel deficit, vel remanet cum foetore.
<td>[85] It seems superfluous to speak about fame, for who can doubt that good kings live in a sense in the praises of men, not only in this life, but still more, after their death, and that men yearn for them? But the name of wicked kings straightway vanishes or, if they have been excessive in their wickedness, they are remembered with execration. Thus Solomon says (Prov 10:7): “The memory of the just is with praises, and the name of the wicked shall rot,” either because it vanishes or it remains with stench.
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<td><b>Caput 12<br>
Quod bona etiam mundialia, ut sunt divitiae, potestas, honor et fama, magis proveniunt regibus quam tyrannis, et de malis in quae incurrunt tyranni etiam in hac vita</b>
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<a name="12" id="12"><b>CHAPTER 12<br>
WHAT PUNISHMENTS ARE IN STORE FOR A TYRANT</b></a>
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<td>Ex his ergo manifestum est quod stabilitas potestatis, divitiae, honor et fama magis regibus quam tyrannis ad votum proveniunt, propter quae tamen indebite adipiscenda declinat in tyrannidem princeps. Nullus enim a iustitia declinat nisi cupiditate alicuius commodi tractus.
<td>[86] From the above arguments it is evident that stability of power, wealth, honour and fame come to fulfil the desires of kings rather than tyrants, and it is in seeking to acquire these things unduly that princes turn to tyranny. For no one falls away from justice except through a desire for some temporal advantage.
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<td>Privatur insuper tyrannus excellentissima beatitudine, quae regibus debetur pro praemio, et, quod est gravius, maximum tormentum sibi acquirit in poenis. Si enim qui unum hominem spoliat, vel in servitutem redigit, vel occidit, maximam poenam meretur, quantum quidem ad iudicium hominum mortem, quantum vero ad iudicium Dei damnationem aeternam; quanto magis putandum est tyrannum deteriora mereri supplicia, qui undique ab omnibus rapit, contra omnium libertatem laborat, pro libito voluntatis suae quoscumque interficit?
<td>[87] The tyrant, moreover, loses the surpassing beatitude which is due as a reward to kings and, which is still more serious, brings upon himself great suffering as a punishment. For if the man who despoils a single man, or casts him into slavery, or kills him, deserves the greatest punishment (death in the judgment of men, and in the judgment of God eternal damnation), how much worse tortures must we consider a tyrant deserves, who on all sides robs everybody, works against the common liberty of all, and kills whom he will at his merest whim?
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<td>Tales insuper raro poenitent, vento inflati superbiae, merito peccatorum a Deo deserti et adulationibus hominum delibuti, et rarius digne satisfacere possunt. Quando enim restituent omnia quae praeter iustitiae debitum abstulerunt? Ad quae tamen restituenda nullus dubitat eos teneri. Quando recompensabunt eis quos oppresserunt et iniuste qualitercumque laeserunt?
<td>[88] Again, such men rarely repent; but puffed up by the wind of pride, deservedly abandoned by God for their sins, and besmirched by the flattery of men, they can rarely make worthy satisfaction. When will they ever restore all those things which they have received beyond their just due? Yet no one doubts that they are bound to restore those ill-gotten goods. When will they make amends to those whom they have oppressed and unjustly injured in their many ways?
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<td>Adiicitur autem ad eorum impoenitentiam quod omnia sibi licita existimant quae impune sine resistentia facere potuerunt: unde non solum emendare non satagunt quae male fecerunt, sed sua consuetudine pro auctoritate utentes, peccandi audaciam transmittunt ad posteros, et sic non solum suorum facinorum apud Deum rei tenentur, sed etiam eorum quibus apud Deum peccandi occasionem reliquerunt.
<td>[89] The malice of their impenitence is increased by the fact that they consider everything licit which they can do unresisted and with impunity. Hence they not only make no effort to repair the evil they have done but, taking their customary way of acting as their authority, they hand on their boldness in sinning to posterity. Consequently they are held guilty before God, not only for their own sins, but also for the crimes of those to whom they gave the occasion of sin.
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