diff --git a/CHANGES.rst b/CHANGES.rst
index 3a7b6848..c4a49a0c 100644
--- a/CHANGES.rst
+++ b/CHANGES.rst
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Change log
 ==========
 
-not released
+v0.1.0a11
 ------------
 
 - The ``filtering.rpsl`` section of general and clients configuration files has been renamed into ``filtering.irrdb``.
diff --git a/docs/_static/examples_default.html b/docs/_static/examples_default.html
index 6510ef6e..1fb4e187 100644
--- a/docs/_static/examples_default.html
+++ b/docs/_static/examples_default.html
@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ <h3>NEXT_HOP attribute</h3>
 <h3>AS_PATH attribute</h3>
 
 <ul>
-<li><p>Prefixes whose <strong>AS_PATH is longer than 32</strong> ASNs are rejected.</p></li>
+<li><p>Routes whose <strong>AS_PATH is longer than 32</strong> ASNs are rejected.</p></li>
 
 <li><p>The <strong>left-most ASN</strong> in the AS_PATH of any route announced to the route server must be the ASN of the announcing client.</p></li>
 
-<li><p>Prefixes whose AS_PATH contains <a href="http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-June/086078.html"><strong>private or invalid ASNs</strong></a> are rejected.</p></li>
+<li><p>Routes whose AS_PATH contains <a href="http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-June/086078.html"><strong>private or invalid ASNs</strong></a> are rejected.</p></li>
 
 </ul>
 
@@ -69,11 +69,11 @@ <h3>IRRDBs prefix/origin ASN enforcement</h3>
 <ul>
 <li><p>
 Origin ASN validity is
-<strong>enforced</strong>. Prefixes whose origin ASN is not authorized by the client's AS-SET are rejected.
+<strong>enforced</strong>. Routes whose origin ASN is not authorized by the client's AS-SET are rejected.
 </p></li>
 
 <li><p>Announced prefixes validity is
-<strong>enforced</strong>. Prefixes that are not part of the client's AS-SET are rejected.
+<strong>enforced</strong>. Routes whose prefix is not part of the client's AS-SET are rejected.
 </p></li>
 
 </ul>
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ <h3>RPKI validation</h3>
 
 <ul>
 
-<li><p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483">RPKI validation</a> of prefixes received by the route server is <strong>disabled</strong>.</p></li>
+<li><p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483">RPKI validation</a> of routes received by the route server is <strong>disabled</strong>.</p></li>
 
 </ul>
 
diff --git a/docs/_static/examples_rich.html b/docs/_static/examples_rich.html
index b83dbc6e..516d4bba 100644
--- a/docs/_static/examples_rich.html
+++ b/docs/_static/examples_rich.html
@@ -55,14 +55,14 @@ <h3>NEXT_HOP attribute</h3>
 <h3>AS_PATH attribute</h3>
 
 <ul>
-<li><p>Prefixes whose <strong>AS_PATH is longer than 32</strong> ASNs are rejected.</p></li>
+<li><p>Routes whose <strong>AS_PATH is longer than 32</strong> ASNs are rejected.</p></li>
 
 <li><p>The <strong>left-most ASN</strong> in the AS_PATH of any route announced to the route server must be the ASN of the announcing client.</p></li>
 
-<li><p>Prefixes whose AS_PATH contains <a href="http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-June/086078.html"><strong>private or invalid ASNs</strong></a> are rejected.</p></li>
+<li><p>Routes whose AS_PATH contains <a href="http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-June/086078.html"><strong>private or invalid ASNs</strong></a> are rejected.</p></li>
 
 <li><p>
-Prefixes with an AS_PATH containing one or more of the following <strong>"transit-free" networks</strong>' ASNs
+Routes with an AS_PATH containing one or more of the following <strong>"transit-free" networks</strong>' ASNs
 are <strong>rejected</strong>.
 </p>
 <p>
@@ -78,15 +78,15 @@ <h3>IRRDBs prefix/origin ASN enforcement</h3>
 <ul>
 <li><p>
 Origin ASN validity is
-<strong>enforced</strong>. Prefixes whose origin ASN is not authorized by the client's AS-SET are rejected.
+<strong>enforced</strong>. Routes whose origin ASN is not authorized by the client's AS-SET are rejected.
 </p></li>
 
 <li><p>Announced prefixes validity is
-<strong>enforced</strong>. Prefixes that are not part of the client's AS-SET are rejected.
+<strong>enforced</strong>. Routes whose prefix is not part of the client's AS-SET are rejected.
 </p></li>
 
 <li><p>
-Prefix <strong>validity state</strong> is signalled to route server clients using the following <strong>BGP communities</strong>:
+Route <strong>validity state</strong> is signalled to route server clients using the following <strong>BGP communities</strong>:
 <table class="table">
 <thead>
   <tr>
@@ -124,11 +124,11 @@ <h3>RPKI validation</h3>
 
 <ul>
 
-<li><p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483">RPKI validation</a> of prefixes received by the route server is <strong>enabled</strong>.</p></li>
+<li><p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483">RPKI validation</a> of routes received by the route server is <strong>enabled</strong>.</p></li>
 
-<li><p>When an INVALID prefix is received by the route server, <strong>it is rejected</strong>.</p></li>
+<li><p>When an INVALID route is received by the route server, <strong>it is rejected</strong>.</p></li>
 <li><p>
-Prefix <strong>validity state</strong> is signalled to route server clients using the following <strong>BGP communities</strong>:
+Route <strong>validity state</strong> is signalled to route server clients using the following <strong>BGP communities</strong>:
 	<table class="table">
 	<thead>
 	  <tr>
@@ -476,13 +476,13 @@ <h2>Blackhole filtering</h2>
 65535:666 (<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7999#section-5">BLACKHOLE</a> well-known community)
 </p></li>
 
-<li><p>By default, prefixes are 
+<li><p>By default, routes are 
 <strong>propagated</strong> to all the clients unless they have been explicitly configured to not receive them.
 </p></li>
 
-<li><p>IPv4 prefixes are propagated to clients after their <strong>NEXT_HOP attribute has been rewritten</strong> to 192.0.2.66.</p></li>
-<li><p>IPv6 prefixes are propagated to clients after their <strong>NEXT_HOP attribute has been rewritten</strong> to 2001:db8:1:1::66.</p></li>
-<li><p>Before being announced to clients, all the prefixes are tagged with the BLACKHOLE well-known community.</p></li>
+<li><p>IPv4 routes are propagated to clients after their <strong>NEXT_HOP attribute has been rewritten</strong> to 192.0.2.66.</p></li>
+<li><p>IPv6 routes are propagated to clients after their <strong>NEXT_HOP attribute has been rewritten</strong> to 2001:db8:1:1::66.</p></li>
+<li><p>Before being announced to clients, all the routes are tagged with the BLACKHOLE well-known community.</p></li>
 
 <li><p>Blackhole filtering requests bypass any RPKI validation check and min/max length check.</p></li>
 </ul>
diff --git a/examples/default/bird4.conf b/examples/default/bird4.conf
index 6855f42b..f2b1b17d 100644
--- a/examples/default/bird4.conf
+++ b/examples/default/bird4.conf
@@ -137,36 +137,36 @@ int set transit_free_asns;
 
 # This function scrubs BGP communities used by the route server
 # for signaling purpose toward its clients. (RFC7454, Section 11)
-# It must be applied on prefixes entering the route server.
+# It must be applied on routes entering the route server.
 function scrub_communities_in() {
 }
 
 # This function scrubs BGP communities used by clients to instruct
 # the route server to perform some actions.
-# It must be applied on prefixes leaving the route server.
+# It must be applied on routes leaving the route server.
 function scrub_communities_out() {
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the prefix is tagged with one of
+# This function verifies if the route is tagged with one of
 # the blackhole filtering communities.
 function is_blackhole_filtering_request() {
 	return false;
 }
 
-# This function must be applied to outgoing prefixes.
-# It applies the blackhole filtering policy to the current prefix.
+# This function must be applied to outgoing routes.
+# It applies the blackhole filtering policy to the current route.
 function apply_blackhole_filtering_policy() {
 	reject "blackhole filtering requested but no policy given - REJECTING ", net;
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the current prefix can be announced to
+# This function verifies if the current route can be announced to
 # the given client on the basis of the attached control BGP
 # communities.
-function prefix_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
+function route_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
 	return true;
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the current prefix matches one of the
+# This function verifies if the current route matches one of the
 # control communities in charge of prepending client's ASN.
 function apply_prepend(int peer_as) {
 
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ function prefix_is_in_AS3333_1_as_set() {
 
 function next_hop_is_valid_for_AS3333_1()
 {
-	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for prefixes announced by AS3333_1
+	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for routes announced by AS3333_1
 	if bgp_next_hop = 192.0.2.11 then return true;
 	return false;
 }
@@ -285,8 +285,8 @@ filter announce_to_AS3333_1 {
 	}
 
 	# BGP control communities
-	if !prefix_can_be_announced_to(3333) then
-		reject "prefix didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS3333_1";
+	if !route_can_be_announced_to(3333) then
+		reject "route didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS3333_1";
 
 	apply_prepend(3333);
 
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ function prefix_is_in_AS10745_1_as_set() {
 
 function next_hop_is_valid_for_AS10745_1()
 {
-	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for prefixes announced by AS10745_1
+	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for routes announced by AS10745_1
 	if bgp_next_hop = 192.0.2.22 then return true;
 	return false;
 }
@@ -399,8 +399,8 @@ filter announce_to_AS10745_1 {
 	}
 
 	# BGP control communities
-	if !prefix_can_be_announced_to(10745) then
-		reject "prefix didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS10745_1";
+	if !route_can_be_announced_to(10745) then
+		reject "route didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS10745_1";
 
 	apply_prepend(10745);
 
diff --git a/examples/default/bird6.conf b/examples/default/bird6.conf
index 55bc86ca..13d558eb 100644
--- a/examples/default/bird6.conf
+++ b/examples/default/bird6.conf
@@ -179,36 +179,36 @@ int set transit_free_asns;
 
 # This function scrubs BGP communities used by the route server
 # for signaling purpose toward its clients. (RFC7454, Section 11)
-# It must be applied on prefixes entering the route server.
+# It must be applied on routes entering the route server.
 function scrub_communities_in() {
 }
 
 # This function scrubs BGP communities used by clients to instruct
 # the route server to perform some actions.
-# It must be applied on prefixes leaving the route server.
+# It must be applied on routes leaving the route server.
 function scrub_communities_out() {
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the prefix is tagged with one of
+# This function verifies if the route is tagged with one of
 # the blackhole filtering communities.
 function is_blackhole_filtering_request() {
 	return false;
 }
 
-# This function must be applied to outgoing prefixes.
-# It applies the blackhole filtering policy to the current prefix.
+# This function must be applied to outgoing routes.
+# It applies the blackhole filtering policy to the current route.
 function apply_blackhole_filtering_policy() {
 	reject "blackhole filtering requested but no policy given - REJECTING ", net;
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the current prefix can be announced to
+# This function verifies if the current route can be announced to
 # the given client on the basis of the attached control BGP
 # communities.
-function prefix_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
+function route_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
 	return true;
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the current prefix matches one of the
+# This function verifies if the current route matches one of the
 # control communities in charge of prepending client's ASN.
 function apply_prepend(int peer_as) {
 
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ function prefix_is_in_AS10745_2_as_set() {
 
 function next_hop_is_valid_for_AS10745_2()
 {
-	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for prefixes announced by AS10745_2
+	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for routes announced by AS10745_2
 	if bgp_next_hop = 2001:db:1:1::22 then return true;
 	return false;
 }
@@ -329,8 +329,8 @@ filter announce_to_AS10745_2 {
 	}
 
 	# BGP control communities
-	if !prefix_can_be_announced_to(10745) then
-		reject "prefix didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS10745_2";
+	if !route_can_be_announced_to(10745) then
+		reject "route didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS10745_2";
 
 	apply_prepend(10745);
 
diff --git a/examples/default/description.html b/examples/default/description.html
index 6510ef6e..1fb4e187 100644
--- a/examples/default/description.html
+++ b/examples/default/description.html
@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ <h3>NEXT_HOP attribute</h3>
 <h3>AS_PATH attribute</h3>
 
 <ul>
-<li><p>Prefixes whose <strong>AS_PATH is longer than 32</strong> ASNs are rejected.</p></li>
+<li><p>Routes whose <strong>AS_PATH is longer than 32</strong> ASNs are rejected.</p></li>
 
 <li><p>The <strong>left-most ASN</strong> in the AS_PATH of any route announced to the route server must be the ASN of the announcing client.</p></li>
 
-<li><p>Prefixes whose AS_PATH contains <a href="http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-June/086078.html"><strong>private or invalid ASNs</strong></a> are rejected.</p></li>
+<li><p>Routes whose AS_PATH contains <a href="http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-June/086078.html"><strong>private or invalid ASNs</strong></a> are rejected.</p></li>
 
 </ul>
 
@@ -69,11 +69,11 @@ <h3>IRRDBs prefix/origin ASN enforcement</h3>
 <ul>
 <li><p>
 Origin ASN validity is
-<strong>enforced</strong>. Prefixes whose origin ASN is not authorized by the client's AS-SET are rejected.
+<strong>enforced</strong>. Routes whose origin ASN is not authorized by the client's AS-SET are rejected.
 </p></li>
 
 <li><p>Announced prefixes validity is
-<strong>enforced</strong>. Prefixes that are not part of the client's AS-SET are rejected.
+<strong>enforced</strong>. Routes whose prefix is not part of the client's AS-SET are rejected.
 </p></li>
 
 </ul>
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ <h3>RPKI validation</h3>
 
 <ul>
 
-<li><p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483">RPKI validation</a> of prefixes received by the route server is <strong>disabled</strong>.</p></li>
+<li><p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483">RPKI validation</a> of routes received by the route server is <strong>disabled</strong>.</p></li>
 
 </ul>
 
diff --git a/examples/rich/bird4.conf b/examples/rich/bird4.conf
index 925728bc..a494e99e 100644
--- a/examples/rich/bird4.conf
+++ b/examples/rich/bird4.conf
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int set transit_free_asns;
 
 # This function scrubs BGP communities used by the route server
 # for signaling purpose toward its clients. (RFC7454, Section 11)
-# It must be applied on prefixes entering the route server.
+# It must be applied on routes entering the route server.
 function scrub_communities_in() {
 	# origin_present_in_as_set
         bgp_community.delete([(65530, 1)]);
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ function scrub_communities_in() {
 
 # This function scrubs BGP communities used by clients to instruct
 # the route server to perform some actions.
-# It must be applied on prefixes leaving the route server.
+# It must be applied on routes leaving the route server.
 function scrub_communities_out() {
 	# blackholing
         bgp_community.delete([(65534, 0)]);
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ function scrub_communities_out() {
 
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the prefix is tagged with one of
+# This function verifies if the route is tagged with one of
 # the blackhole filtering communities.
 function is_blackhole_filtering_request() {
 	if (65535, 666) ~ bgp_community then
@@ -239,18 +239,18 @@ function is_blackhole_filtering_request() {
 	return false;
 }
 
-# This function must be applied to outgoing prefixes.
-# It applies the blackhole filtering policy to the current prefix.
+# This function must be applied to outgoing routes.
+# It applies the blackhole filtering policy to the current route.
 function apply_blackhole_filtering_policy() {
 	# Configured policy: rewrite-next-hop
 	bgp_community.add((65535, 666));
 	bgp_next_hop = 192.0.2.66;
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the current prefix can be announced to
+# This function verifies if the current route can be announced to
 # the given client on the basis of the attached control BGP
 # communities.
-function prefix_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
+function route_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
 	# do_not_announce_to_peer
 	if peer_as <= 65535 then {
 		if (0, peer_as) ~ bgp_community then
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ function prefix_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
 	return true;
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the current prefix matches one of the
+# This function verifies if the current route matches one of the
 # control communities in charge of prepending client's ASN.
 function apply_prepend(int peer_as) {
 	# prepend_once_to_peer
@@ -373,11 +373,11 @@ function add_rpki_community(string comm_name) {
 }
 
 # This functions performs RPKI validation of the current
-# prefix and adds the informative communities.
-# If the prefix is INVALID and the 'rpki.reject_invalid'
+# route and adds the informative communities.
+# If the route is INVALID and the 'rpki.reject_invalid'
 # option is True the functions return false; otherwise it
 # returns true.
-function prefix_passes_rpki_validation () {
+function route_passes_rpki_validation () {
 	case roa_check(RPKI) {
 		ROA_VALID: add_rpki_community("valid");
 		ROA_UNKNOWN: add_rpki_community("unknown");
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ function prefix_is_in_AS3333_1_as_set() {
 
 function next_hop_is_valid_for_AS3333_1()
 {
-	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for prefixes announced by AS3333_1
+	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for routes announced by AS3333_1
 	if bgp_next_hop = 192.0.2.11 then return true;	# AS3333_1
 	return false;
 }
@@ -488,8 +488,8 @@ filter receive_from_AS3333_1 {
 	if is_blackhole_filtering_request() then {
 		accept "blackhole filtering request from AS3333_1 - ACCEPTING ", net;
 	} else {
-		if !prefix_passes_rpki_validation() then
-			reject "RPKI, prefix is INVALID - REJECTING ", net;
+		if !route_passes_rpki_validation() then
+			reject "RPKI, route is INVALID - REJECTING ", net;
 
 		# Prefix: length
 		if !prefix_len_is_valid(8, 24) then
@@ -506,8 +506,8 @@ filter announce_to_AS3333_1 {
 	}
 
 	# BGP control communities
-	if !prefix_can_be_announced_to(3333) then
-		reject "prefix didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS3333_1";
+	if !route_can_be_announced_to(3333) then
+		reject "route didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS3333_1";
 
 	apply_prepend(3333);
 
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ function prefix_is_in_AS10745_1_as_set() {
 
 function next_hop_is_valid_for_AS10745_1()
 {
-	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for prefixes announced by AS10745_1
+	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for routes announced by AS10745_1
 	if bgp_next_hop = 192.0.2.22 then return true;	# AS10745_1
 	return false;
 }
@@ -614,8 +614,8 @@ filter receive_from_AS10745_1 {
 	if is_blackhole_filtering_request() then {
 		accept "blackhole filtering request from AS10745_1 - ACCEPTING ", net;
 	} else {
-		if !prefix_passes_rpki_validation() then
-			reject "RPKI, prefix is INVALID - REJECTING ", net;
+		if !route_passes_rpki_validation() then
+			reject "RPKI, route is INVALID - REJECTING ", net;
 
 		# Prefix: length
 		if !prefix_len_is_valid(8, 24) then
@@ -632,8 +632,8 @@ filter announce_to_AS10745_1 {
 	}
 
 	# BGP control communities
-	if !prefix_can_be_announced_to(10745) then
-		reject "prefix didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS10745_1";
+	if !route_can_be_announced_to(10745) then
+		reject "route didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS10745_1";
 
 	apply_prepend(10745);
 
diff --git a/examples/rich/bird6.conf b/examples/rich/bird6.conf
index f23c813e..2b0a538b 100644
--- a/examples/rich/bird6.conf
+++ b/examples/rich/bird6.conf
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ int set transit_free_asns;
 
 # This function scrubs BGP communities used by the route server
 # for signaling purpose toward its clients. (RFC7454, Section 11)
-# It must be applied on prefixes entering the route server.
+# It must be applied on routes entering the route server.
 function scrub_communities_in() {
 	# origin_present_in_as_set
         bgp_community.delete([(65530, 1)]);
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ function scrub_communities_in() {
 
 # This function scrubs BGP communities used by clients to instruct
 # the route server to perform some actions.
-# It must be applied on prefixes leaving the route server.
+# It must be applied on routes leaving the route server.
 function scrub_communities_out() {
 	# blackholing
         bgp_community.delete([(65534, 0)]);
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ function scrub_communities_out() {
 
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the prefix is tagged with one of
+# This function verifies if the route is tagged with one of
 # the blackhole filtering communities.
 function is_blackhole_filtering_request() {
 	if (65535, 666) ~ bgp_community then
@@ -281,18 +281,18 @@ function is_blackhole_filtering_request() {
 	return false;
 }
 
-# This function must be applied to outgoing prefixes.
-# It applies the blackhole filtering policy to the current prefix.
+# This function must be applied to outgoing routes.
+# It applies the blackhole filtering policy to the current route.
 function apply_blackhole_filtering_policy() {
 	# Configured policy: rewrite-next-hop
 	bgp_community.add((65535, 666));
 	bgp_next_hop = 2001:db8:1:1::66;
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the current prefix can be announced to
+# This function verifies if the current route can be announced to
 # the given client on the basis of the attached control BGP
 # communities.
-function prefix_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
+function route_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
 	# do_not_announce_to_peer
 	if peer_as <= 65535 then {
 		if (0, peer_as) ~ bgp_community then
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ function prefix_can_be_announced_to(int peer_as) {
 	return true;
 }
 
-# This function verifies if the current prefix matches one of the
+# This function verifies if the current route matches one of the
 # control communities in charge of prepending client's ASN.
 function apply_prepend(int peer_as) {
 	# prepend_once_to_peer
@@ -415,11 +415,11 @@ function add_rpki_community(string comm_name) {
 }
 
 # This functions performs RPKI validation of the current
-# prefix and adds the informative communities.
-# If the prefix is INVALID and the 'rpki.reject_invalid'
+# route and adds the informative communities.
+# If the route is INVALID and the 'rpki.reject_invalid'
 # option is True the functions return false; otherwise it
 # returns true.
-function prefix_passes_rpki_validation () {
+function route_passes_rpki_validation () {
 	case roa_check(RPKI) {
 		ROA_VALID: add_rpki_community("valid");
 		ROA_UNKNOWN: add_rpki_community("unknown");
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ function prefix_is_in_AS10745_2_as_set() {
 
 function next_hop_is_valid_for_AS10745_2()
 {
-	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for prefixes announced by AS10745_2
+	# Checks if NEXT_HOP is one of those allowed for routes announced by AS10745_2
 	if bgp_next_hop = 2001:db:1:1::22 then return true;	# AS10745_2
 	return false;
 }
@@ -532,8 +532,8 @@ filter receive_from_AS10745_2 {
 	if is_blackhole_filtering_request() then {
 		accept "blackhole filtering request from AS10745_2 - ACCEPTING ", net;
 	} else {
-		if !prefix_passes_rpki_validation() then
-			reject "RPKI, prefix is INVALID - REJECTING ", net;
+		if !route_passes_rpki_validation() then
+			reject "RPKI, route is INVALID - REJECTING ", net;
 
 		# Prefix: length
 		if !prefix_len_is_valid(12, 48) then
@@ -550,8 +550,8 @@ filter announce_to_AS10745_2 {
 	}
 
 	# BGP control communities
-	if !prefix_can_be_announced_to(10745) then
-		reject "prefix didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS10745_2";
+	if !route_can_be_announced_to(10745) then
+		reject "route didn't pass control communities checks - NOT ANNOUNCING ", net, " TO AS10745_2";
 
 	apply_prepend(10745);
 
diff --git a/examples/rich/description.html b/examples/rich/description.html
index b83dbc6e..516d4bba 100644
--- a/examples/rich/description.html
+++ b/examples/rich/description.html
@@ -55,14 +55,14 @@ <h3>NEXT_HOP attribute</h3>
 <h3>AS_PATH attribute</h3>
 
 <ul>
-<li><p>Prefixes whose <strong>AS_PATH is longer than 32</strong> ASNs are rejected.</p></li>
+<li><p>Routes whose <strong>AS_PATH is longer than 32</strong> ASNs are rejected.</p></li>
 
 <li><p>The <strong>left-most ASN</strong> in the AS_PATH of any route announced to the route server must be the ASN of the announcing client.</p></li>
 
-<li><p>Prefixes whose AS_PATH contains <a href="http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-June/086078.html"><strong>private or invalid ASNs</strong></a> are rejected.</p></li>
+<li><p>Routes whose AS_PATH contains <a href="http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-June/086078.html"><strong>private or invalid ASNs</strong></a> are rejected.</p></li>
 
 <li><p>
-Prefixes with an AS_PATH containing one or more of the following <strong>"transit-free" networks</strong>' ASNs
+Routes with an AS_PATH containing one or more of the following <strong>"transit-free" networks</strong>' ASNs
 are <strong>rejected</strong>.
 </p>
 <p>
@@ -78,15 +78,15 @@ <h3>IRRDBs prefix/origin ASN enforcement</h3>
 <ul>
 <li><p>
 Origin ASN validity is
-<strong>enforced</strong>. Prefixes whose origin ASN is not authorized by the client's AS-SET are rejected.
+<strong>enforced</strong>. Routes whose origin ASN is not authorized by the client's AS-SET are rejected.
 </p></li>
 
 <li><p>Announced prefixes validity is
-<strong>enforced</strong>. Prefixes that are not part of the client's AS-SET are rejected.
+<strong>enforced</strong>. Routes whose prefix is not part of the client's AS-SET are rejected.
 </p></li>
 
 <li><p>
-Prefix <strong>validity state</strong> is signalled to route server clients using the following <strong>BGP communities</strong>:
+Route <strong>validity state</strong> is signalled to route server clients using the following <strong>BGP communities</strong>:
 <table class="table">
 <thead>
   <tr>
@@ -124,11 +124,11 @@ <h3>RPKI validation</h3>
 
 <ul>
 
-<li><p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483">RPKI validation</a> of prefixes received by the route server is <strong>enabled</strong>.</p></li>
+<li><p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6483">RPKI validation</a> of routes received by the route server is <strong>enabled</strong>.</p></li>
 
-<li><p>When an INVALID prefix is received by the route server, <strong>it is rejected</strong>.</p></li>
+<li><p>When an INVALID route is received by the route server, <strong>it is rejected</strong>.</p></li>
 <li><p>
-Prefix <strong>validity state</strong> is signalled to route server clients using the following <strong>BGP communities</strong>:
+Route <strong>validity state</strong> is signalled to route server clients using the following <strong>BGP communities</strong>:
 	<table class="table">
 	<thead>
 	  <tr>
@@ -476,13 +476,13 @@ <h2>Blackhole filtering</h2>
 65535:666 (<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7999#section-5">BLACKHOLE</a> well-known community)
 </p></li>
 
-<li><p>By default, prefixes are 
+<li><p>By default, routes are 
 <strong>propagated</strong> to all the clients unless they have been explicitly configured to not receive them.
 </p></li>
 
-<li><p>IPv4 prefixes are propagated to clients after their <strong>NEXT_HOP attribute has been rewritten</strong> to 192.0.2.66.</p></li>
-<li><p>IPv6 prefixes are propagated to clients after their <strong>NEXT_HOP attribute has been rewritten</strong> to 2001:db8:1:1::66.</p></li>
-<li><p>Before being announced to clients, all the prefixes are tagged with the BLACKHOLE well-known community.</p></li>
+<li><p>IPv4 routes are propagated to clients after their <strong>NEXT_HOP attribute has been rewritten</strong> to 192.0.2.66.</p></li>
+<li><p>IPv6 routes are propagated to clients after their <strong>NEXT_HOP attribute has been rewritten</strong> to 2001:db8:1:1::66.</p></li>
+<li><p>Before being announced to clients, all the routes are tagged with the BLACKHOLE well-known community.</p></li>
 
 <li><p>Blackhole filtering requests bypass any RPKI validation check and min/max length check.</p></li>
 </ul>
diff --git a/pierky/arouteserver/version.py b/pierky/arouteserver/version.py
index 2955e676..2071051c 100644
--- a/pierky/arouteserver/version.py
+++ b/pierky/arouteserver/version.py
@@ -13,5 +13,5 @@
 # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 # along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 
-__version__ = "0.1.0a10"
+__version__ = "0.1.0a11"
 COPYRIGHT_YEAR = 2017